

THE THIRD JEWISH LAW FELLOWSHIP LECTURE

OBJECTIVITY AND SUBJECTIVITY
IN JEWISH LEGAL DECISIONS:
THE DEBATE ON AID

by

Rabbi Dr. Louis Jacobs

The Yarnton Trust
for
THE OXFORD CENTRE
FOR POSTGRADUATE HEBREW STUDIES
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Objectivity and Subjectivity in Jewish Legal Decisions: The Debate on AID

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When a new situation gives rise to an Halakhic problem, the usual procedure in the Responsa literature is to use analogy in order to discover a precedent in the law. The subsequent debates on the correctness or otherwise of whatever decision is given will depend on whether the analogy is sound and therefore to be accepted or whether it is inexact and the decision based on it to be rejected or, at least, remain unsupported.

A good illustration of the process is provided by the contemporary Halakhic debate, to be examined in this lecture, on the question of the artificial insemination of a married woman by a donor other than her husband—AID. The recently discovered method of impregnating a woman by means of artificial insemination was obviously unknown in ancient times but the Talmud (*Hagigah* 15a) does know of a woman who became pregnant through bathing in a bath (*ambati*) into which a man had previously deposited his semen. (Whether this is medically sound has been discussed by the commentators¹ but is irrelevant for a discussion of the law. Even if such a thing could never actually take place, the fact remains that the Talmud has a view on what the law would be if it could take place and the Talmud is the final court of appeal for Orthodox Jewish law).

Moses Lima (d.1658) discusses² whether the child a woman impregnated in this manner, by bathing in the *ambati*, is treated in law as the son of the man who had deposited therein his semen. Is the child counted as his, for instance, for the purpose of the fulfilment of the duty of procreation? Lima argues that the child is the child of the 'donor' for all purposes of the law. He bases his opinion on the curious legend³ that the prophet Jeremiah was compelled by his enemies to deposit his semen in a bath, after which the prophet's daughter bathed therein and became impregnated, giving birth, as a result, to Ben Sira! Since Ben Sira is declared to be the son of the prophet it follows that a son born in this manner is the legal son of the 'donor'.

Samuel b. Uri Shraga Phoebus (second half of the 17th century), in his commentary to the *Shulḥan 'Arukh*, entitled *Bet Shmuel*, seeks to prove it from another source. He refers to a source quoted by Joel Sirkes (1561–1640, author of *Bayit Ḥadash*, abbreviated *Baḥ*; the *Baḥ*⁴ gives as his source R. Perez of Corbeil (d.c. 1295) in his notes to the work of his teacher, Isaac of Corbeil, the *Sefer Mitzvot Katan* (the *Semak*). Perez discusses why a menstruant (*niddah*) is permitted to sleep on sheets on which her husband had previously slept and yet married women do take care not to sleep on sheets on which a man other than their husband had previously slept. Perez replies that even in the very unlikely event of the menstruant becoming pregnant as a result of sleeping on the sheets no harm is done. A menstruant is forbidden to have intercourse with her husband but here no intercourse had taken place. In the case of the married woman, on the other hand, although here, too, it is only the act of intercourse that is forbidden, yet if she does become pregnant from the semen of a man other than her husband that man may have children from his wife and when the child grows up he may inadvertently marry his sister. This fear, that a brother might marry his sister is found in the Talmud (*Yevamot* 37b) where it is stated that a man should not marry a woman in one country and another in a different country 'because this might result in a brother marrying his sister'.

Turning now to the AID question, we must first note the views of the famous Orthodox Rabbinic authority, R, Moshe Feinstein (1895–1986) who argues for a permissive attitude.

Rabbi Feinstein's Responsum on the subject,⁵ dated *Rosh Hodesh Adar* 5721 (= 1960) is headed: 'Concerning a woman into whose womb a doctor injected the semen of another man. Is the woman forbidden to her husband and are there any doubts regarding the status of the child?' The basic legal issue is this: A married woman who had relations with a man other than her husband, while she was married to him, is forbidden henceforth to her husband and the child born of her union with her lover is a *mamzer*.⁶ Do these rules apply where, as in AID, there had been no sexual act, only insemination of the woman? In the actual case considered by Rabbi Feinstein the wife did not consult her husband. When the doctors had informed her that her husband was infertile she had recourse to AID and presented her husband with a *fait accompli*.

Rabbi Feinstein begins his reply that the desire of a woman to be a mother is normal and perfectly legitimate. This desire is acknowledged in the Talmudic ruling (*Yevamot* 65b) that a wife whose husband had failed to give her children can petition for divorce on these grounds. Even though the duty of procreation does not devolve on a woman⁷ she can still demand that a divorce with full legal settlement be granted on the grounds that she needs a child to take care of her in her old age. From the Biblical narratives, too, we can see how passionately the matriarchs longed for children.

In the case he considers, Rabbi Feinstein states categorically that the wife is permitted to her husband and the child is not a *mamzer*. It is the sexual act with a man other than her husband that renders a married woman forbidden to her husband and the child a *mamzer*, not the injection of the semen. That this is so can be seen from the fact that where the act has taken place even without any ejection of semen or where anal

intercourse took place the woman still becomes forbidden to her husband. This demonstrates that it is the adulterous act of intercourse that renders her forbidden and whether or not there was an emission of semen is irrelevant. Intercourse without emission of semen renders her forbidden. Conversely, the insertion of the semen of another man does not render her forbidden. By the same token the child is only a *mamzer* when conceived as a result of the sexual act. True the child is a *mamzer* even if the act was done under coercion (say, where the couple were forced to have intercourse under the threat of death) and without any pleasure in the act. But in that case there had been an adulterous act, albeit one for which there is no culpability. Where, on the other hand, there has been impregnation without intercourse, as in the case of the *ambati* and in the case of AID, the fact that the semen of a man other than the husband has been injected into the wife does not render the child conceived as a result a *mamzer*. That this is so can be demonstrated from the case of Ben Sira. A child born of an incestuous union is a *mamzer* so why is it nowhere suggested that Ben Sira was a *mamzer*? This can only be because there was no act of intercourse. As for those who argue⁸ that a child born as a result of AID must be considered to be a *mamzer* since even when a child is born as a result of adulterous intercourse where there is no pleasure in the act that child is a *mamzer*, Rabbi Feinstein dismisses such an argument as ‘nonsense’ (*hevel*). Even where there is no pleasure in the act it is still an adulterous act, whereas in the case of AID there is no act at all.

Rabbi Feinstein adds that where the identity of the donor is known the child born as a result of AID would not be allowed to marry one of the donor’s other children since, in law, the donor is the father of the child. But where the identity of the donor is unknown the fear ‘that a brother might come to marry his sister’ can safely be disregarded. His argument here is based on the accepted ruling that the child of a Jewish mother and Gentile father is the child of the mother not of the father and he may consequently marry another child of his natural father from another

Jewish woman. Since the majority of citizens in the USA are non-Jews the principle of *rov* ('probability') comes into operation so that the fear, mentioned in the Talmud, of a brother marrying his sister is non-existent. However, Rabbi Feinstein concludes, where, as in the case he is considering, the wife resorted to AID without first informing her husband, the husband has no legal obligation for the child's maintenance or for any expenses incurred in the birth and hospital treatment.

Rabbi Feinstein deals with the question at greater length in another Responsum⁹ dated *Rosh Hodesh Nisan 5719* (=1959) and with the heading: 'Concerning the law where a woman has been inseminated as practised nowadays by the doctors'. Rabbi Feinstein repeats his argument that it is intercourse alone that renders the woman forbidden to her husband. And, as he remarks in the other Responsum, the fear, mentioned by Perez, that a brother might come to marry his sister, does not apply since the majority of donors are Gentiles. The authority who writes¹⁰: 'Heaven forbid that a Jewish woman should be so abandoned as to engage in the form of mechanical adultery which the doctors have nowadays introduced', is way off the mark. There is no question of adultery with regard to AID since there is no intercourse. The only possible objection is because of the fear of a brother marrying his sister and, for the reason stated, this does not apply to AID.

In yet another Responsum¹¹ Rabbi Feinstein replies to the lengthy critique of his position by Rabbi M.H.E. Bloch. This Responsum, dated *Sivan 22,5722* (=1962) begins: 'I have received your lengthy missive full of rebuke, taking me to task because of what I wrote in Responsa Nos. 10 and 71, which, in your opinion, will bring about some breach in the purity and sanctity of the genealogical pride of the Jewish community. The truth is, however, that there is nothing in all I have written and decided to bring about, Heaven forbid, any desecration of Israel's purity and sanctity but it is all based on the true Torah of our early teachers'. Rabbi Feinstein repeats his arguments. But evidently Rabbi

Bloch had put forward a new argument against Rabbi Feinstein to which the latter now addresses himself.

Of a married woman's adultery Scripture (Leviticus 18:20) uses the expression 'lying for seed' (*zera'*) which can be interpreted to mean that the prohibition does apply to insemination even where there is no intercourse since, after all, the woman has the 'seed' of a man other than her husband in her womb. But, Rabbi Feinstein points out, Abraham Ibn Ezra, in his commentary to the verse, castigates those who stress the word *zera* to yield this interpretation since it might then be concluded that the offence of adultery depends on whether the woman became pregnant. The Talmud (*Yevamot* 55b) understands the word *zera* to exclude intercourse with an inert member or, according to those who hold that this, too, constitutes adultery, to exclude an act of necrophilia. And the Talmud (*Yevamot* 49a) states emphatically that a child has the status of a *mamzer* through his having been born as a result of the forbidden act of intercourse, not because he has been born of foreign 'seed'. It follows that when Nahmanides¹² comments: 'It is possible that when Scripture says *lezera'* there is a hint at the reason for the prohibition for it will not be known to whom the seed belongs', Heaven forbid that we should understand him to be giving the real reason, thereby giving sinners, as Ibn Ezra says, an opportunity to limit the scope of the prohibition. How can this possibly be the true reason since the laws regarding identification of progeny—*havhanah*¹³ are Rabbinic not Biblical? Nahmanides can only mean that in the case of a married woman committing adultery there is the additional reason to which he refers. But it is obviously not the true reason and Nahmanides could never have intended to give it any Halakhic status. If he were not afraid to do so, states Rabbi Feinstein, he would suggest that this whole passage in Nahmanides is not the great teacher's but an interpolation by an ignorant disciple of the master. All the authorities who quote Perez agree that if the woman did have a child through sleeping on the sheets, that child would not be a *mamzer* since no illicit act of intercourse had taken place.

Even though, Rabbi Feinstein continues, he had described the view that the child is a *mamzer* as ‘nonsense’ it was only in the heat of the moment without any disrespect being intended. But it remains true that it is only in the first instance that the Talmud frowns on a man having wives in different countries out of the fear that a brother might marry his sister. If a man did have wives in different countries his children would be allowed to marry without having to take into account the extreme improbability that of all the prospective candidates for marriage they would come up with a sibling. And in the case of AID it is permitted even in the first instance for the reason stated, that the majority of donors are Gentiles.

Rabbi Feinstein now turns to the question of *havhanah*. This law is stated in the Talmud (*Yevamot* 42a–b) according to which a man must wait three months of her widowhood before marrying a widow, otherwise the child born to her after seven months of the second marriage would be of doubtful parentage—either a nine month child from the first husband or a seven month child from the second husband. Various reasons are advanced for why it is essential to establish with certainty the child’s parentage—*havhanah* means; ‘distinguishing’ i.e. establishing who is the real father of a child. Now, on the face of it, as Rabbi Bloch had evidently argued, this law would preclude resort to AID since people will assume that the child is that of the woman’s husband whereas, in fact, he is the natural child of the donor. Rabbi Feinstein has no difficulty of disposing of this objection. In the case of *havhanah* it cannot be known which of the two is the father but here it is known that the child is the donor’s. No one has ever suggested that it is forbidden for a man to adopt an infant on the grounds that people will imagine the child to be his natural child.

At this stage Rabbi J. Breisch of Switzerland enters the fray; in his Responsa collection, *Helkat Yaakov*¹⁴, where a number of Responsa are devoted to a critique of Feinstein’s view, giving Feinstein the opportu-

nity to reply, which the latter does in a letter dated *Kislev* 24, 5725 (=1965).. Here Feinstein, while repeating his arguments, takes issue with new objections voiced by Breisch.

The *Sefer Ḥasidim*¹⁵ writes that if the Gentiles refrain from eating a certain food (the example given is the meat of an animal with which a human being had committed bestiality) Jews should not eat that food even though it is permissible in Jewish law. The reason for this strictness is because it is wrong for Jews to give the impression that they have lower standards of sanctity and morality than Gentiles. Since, Breisch argues, the Catholics forbid resort to AID and are very severe in their condemnation of the practice, it would constitute a profanation of the divine name if the Jewish authorities were to permit it. Surely, retorts Feinstein, the *Sefer Ḥasidim* cannot possibly mean that Jews are obliged to base their standards of morality on those of Christian dogma. The *Sefer Ḥasidim* refers only to matters reprehensible on general universal standards of morality. But with regard to AID the Catholic objection is on doctrinal grounds; the point at issue being precisely this question of whether Scripture forbids the act of adultery *per se* or because of the emission of semen. As Ibn Ezra has noted, the Jewish understanding is morally superior in that it strictly forbids the act whether or not there is an emission of semen. To apply the principle stated in the *Sefer Ḥasidim* to AID is to make nonsense of the stern warning that Jews must not adopt practices based on the dogmas of a faith other than Judaism.

Breisch mentions a further reason for the prohibition of AID. According to the Talmud (*Yevamot* 42a) the law of *havhanah* mentioned above applies also to a Gentile couple who became converted to Judaism. They must wait three months after their conversion before having marital relations so as to distinguish between a child conceived in 'holiness' and one conceived while they were still Gentiles i.e. it can be established at three months whether or not the woman is pregnant. Why is it important to know whether or not the child was conceived in 'holiness'? Breisch

understands it to be on the grounds that a child conceived while its parents were Jews is superior in holiness to a child conceived while the parents were Gentiles. If this is so, Breisch argues, a fortiori it should be forbidden for a Jewish woman to allow herself to become impregnated with the 'seed' of a Gentile in AID. Feinstein reacts vehemently against such a 'racialist' interpretation. Where is it suggested, he asks, even remotely that a convert to Judaism is racially inferior? The Talmud certainly does not mean to suggest that the child conceived while the parents were Gentiles is inferior, only that there must be no confusion regarding the child's parentage i.e. there must be no confusion regarding whether or not the child was 'sown in holiness'. It is purely a matter of accurate definition. In the case of AID there is no confusion since, on the probability principle, it is established that the child has certainly been 'sown' by a Gentile. There is not the slightest suggestion that a child whose mother is Jewish and his father a Gentile is racially or spiritually inferior to a child both parents of which are Jews.

We turn now to the chief opponent of Rabbi Feinstein, the Sotmarer Rebbe, Rabbi Joel Teitelbaum (188–1979). In the Sotmarer's Responsa collection, *Divrey Yoel*, there are lengthy Responsa attacking the Feinstein position¹⁶ In the biography of Rabbi Feinstein, published soon after his death,¹⁷ it is told that a delegation of Rabbis made its way to Feinstein to persuade him to retract. Before leaving, the members of the delegation sought the Sotmarer's blessing on their enterprise. The Rebbe, noted for his sense of humour, said to them: 'But what will you do if he seeks to engage you in a discussion of Torah?'

The Sotmarer prefaces his remarks¹⁸ by expressing his astonishment that Feinstein should have given such a perverse ruling as to permit AID. He goes on to present the arguments against Feinstein most of which the latter had already demolished. Some of the Sotmarer's arguments are less than convincing. For instance, he suggests that the reason why the child is not a *mamzer* in the Perez case or the Ben Sira case is because in these cases the semen had been injected automatically without any

action whatever on the part of the woman, whereas in AID the semen is actually inserted into her womb. This distinction is obviously forced and it is clear from the Sotmarer's Responsa that he believes AID to be so obviously morally reprehensible that the flimsiest Halakhic arguments are admissible. On the argument from Nahmanides' interpretation, the Sotmarer admits that the question of 'seed' cannot be the main reason but it is nonetheless a reason and one advanced by one of the greatest Halakhic authorities and this is sufficient to ban the practice even though there is no actual intercourse.

The 'racist' motif appears in a particularly offensive form in the strange book published by Rabbi Yom Tov Halevi Schwartz, *Maaneh le-Iggerot*.¹⁹ Schwartz's stated aim in this book is to demolish Feinstein's standing as a posek, seeking, on the whole quite unsuccessfully, to show that Feinstein is often in error in his Halakhic decisions. To the unbiased reader Schwartz cannot hold a candle to Feinstein in Halakhic expertise and Talmudic learning. Schwartz takes issue with Feinstein's views on AID in the body of the work but in the Introduction to the book the Feinstein position is attacked particularly in these terms:

'For it is well-known that the reason why we Jews are compassionate is because we are the children of compassionate parents. We have inherited this quality from our remote ancestors reaching back to Abraham and Sarah. ..The only reason we have succeeded in this long, bitter exile in preserving our capacity for compassion, modesty and benevolence is because we have preserved our racial purity so that no foreign seed should be mixed with ours to destroy our character...So how can we now agree with the torah of Rabbi Moshe which allows kosher Jewish daughters to mix clean blood with unclean, to contaminate the whole house of Israel, Heaven forbid, with unclean blood and with the corrupt qualities of the seed of Amalek, may his name be blotted out. And who can guarantee that this kosher woman who follows Rabbi Moshe's decision will not have the merit of bearing a son to one of the

murderers at Auschwitz who murdered the father or one of the other relatives of that woman’.

As for the ruling that the child of a Jewish mother and a Gentile father is a Jew, Schwartz admits that this is the law where it is a *fait accompli* but how can anyone suggest that it is permitted, as in AID, in the first instance.

Although in his reply to Breisch²⁰ Feinstein protests that he never intended for his decision to be acted upon, yet to the end of his long life he remained firmly convinced that his ruling was correct. In Volume Four of his *Responsa*²¹ he replies to ten questions put to him by Rabbi E. Ellinson, in a *Responsum* dated *Marcheshvan 5743* (–1982) i.e. when Feinstein was 87 years of age. Evidently, Ellinson had asked Feinstein whether, in the light of all the opposition to his views, he had retracted. Feinstein replies: ‘It is all true and perfectly clear and I have no need to retract. There are no objections to artificial insemination where the donor is a Gentile’. For all that, Feinstein concludes, he has never given a permissive decision in such a case. (He probably means a direct decision given to a woman who consulted him. The first two *Responsa* on the subject are in the form of replies put to him by other Rabbis so that, whatever he writes, the actual decision is theirs alone).

‘However, I have never given any actual ruling since it is of no avail to the husband so far as the duty of procreation is concerned and the wife does not have this obligation, It can easily result in the husband becoming very jealous Consequently, it is not good counsel, To those who have disagreed with me I have given clear replies but none of these have been published except for the reply I had given to the Gaon Rabbi M. Breisch of blessed memory. I have no desire to write any more on this subject even as a theoretical exercise To be sure one should not advise the adoption of this procedure for the reason I have given But if anyone did have recourse to it the child is kosher and, if a daughter, she may

marry a priest'

It would be too much to say that Feinstein has climbed down here. He repeats that his decision is correct according to the law. Yet he seems to have become tired of the whole matter and nothing further is heard of the desire of a woman to become a mother, the extra-Halakhic motif with which he began the whole discussion. To be sure Feinstein operates more within standard Halakhic categories than his opponents but he, too, is swayed by extra-legal considerations; at first in his appreciation of the strong desire of a woman to become a mother, and, in the end, by fearing to cause the husband to be jealous.

Feinstein's opponents hardly seek to hide their extra-Halakhic motivation, using Halakhic arguments and the Halakhic process in order to demonstrate what to them is axiomatic on the grounds of general morality. Especially, the appeals to prevent a profanation of the divine name, the extravagant advocacy of 'racialism', and the use of expressions like 'abomination', 'artificial adultery', show that for Feinstein's opponents there is the strongest conviction that AID is so intrinsically reprehensible that if the Halakhah appears to countenance it, the Halakhah must be understood, come what may, so as to condemn the practice.

In my book *A Tree of Life* I argue that the great Halakhists are often influenced by their general view of Judaism so that, even when they operate within the Halakhic process and with Halakhic style argumentation, they are not only saying what the law is but also determining what the law must be if other Jewish values, as seen by them, are to be upheld. There can be few better examples of this than the contemporary Halakhic debate on the legitimacy or otherwise of AID.

From all this, and from the many other examples I have given in my book, it is clear that the great Halakhists are governed in their decision making by considerations other than those of pure Halakhah, Consciously

or unconsciously, the Halakhists are not only asking what the law is but also determining what the law should be if the general values of Judaism, as they see these, are to be realised. You no doubt recall the famous Clarihew:

The art of Biography
Is different from Geography.

Geography is about maps,
But Biography is about chaps.

So far as the Halakhists are concerned, the 'chaps' are conditioned, if that is not too strong a term, by their 'maps'. They are what they are, in part, at least, by where they live, by their particular Jewish environment. And being what they are they can do no other than be true to their own vision of Judaism and decide accordingly; all of which makes for variety and flexibility in Halakhic decision making. Like it or not this is how the Halakhic process operates, Meredith said:

Ah, what a dusty answer gets the soul
When hot for certainties in this our life

There is no area of Jewish life and thought where greater certainty is to be had than in the Halakhah, with its great precision and strong sense of continuity. Yet even here, since the Halakhists are human beings of differing temperaments, while the actual decisions may be delivered with an air of certainty and finality, it remains true that, especially on matters of profound moral concern, certainties are not to be had. This is the answer the sincere inquirer gets when he asks what the Halakhah is on this or that complicated moral question. A 'dusty answer' maybe but the only answer possible in the circumstances.

Footnotes

- 1 See the sources quoted in *Otzar ha-Posekim*, Vol. 1, Jer., 1970, par 1 No. 42 p and the articles on the subject in *Noam*, Vol. 1, Jer., 1958, pp 111-116. Cf. Immanuel Jakobovits *Jewish Medical Ethics*, sec. ed. New York, 1975 pp 244-250, Fred Rosner: 'Artificial Insemination in Jewish Law' in *Jewish Bioethics*, ed. Fred Rosner and J. David Bleich, New York, 1 979 pp 105 1 1,
- 2 *Helkat Mehokek*, *Even ha-'Ezer* 1 note 8
- 3 For this legend see Louis Ginzberg *Legends of the Jews*, Philadelphia, 1946, Vol. 6, pp 400-402
- 4 *Bah to Tur*, *Yoreh Deah* 195, quoted also by *Taz*. *Yorez Deah* 195 note 7. The *Bet Shmuel* source is *Even ha-'Ezer*, op. cit. note 10.
- 5 *Iggerot Moshe*, *Even ha-'Ezer*, New York, 1974, Responsum No. 10
- 6 On the law of *mamzer* see my *A Tree of Life*, OUP, 1984, Appendix B, pp. 257-275
- 7 Mishnah and Gemara *Yevamot* 65b
- 8 Quoted in *Otzar ha-Posekim*, loc. cit.
- 9 *Iggerot Moshe*, *Even ha-'Ezer*, New York, 1974, Responsom No. 71
- 10 Quoted in *Otzar ha-Posekim*, loc. cit.
- 11 *Iggerot Moshe*, *Hoshen Mishpat* etc., New York, 1964, *Even ha-'Ezer*, Responsum No. 11
- 12 *Perush ha-Ramban 'al ha-Torah* ed. C.D. Chavel, Jer., 1960 p 105. For the Ibn Ezra passage see *Ibn Ezra 'al ha-Torah*, ed. A. Weiser, Jer., 1977, to verse Leviticus 18:20, Vol. 3 p. 57
- 13 See *Entziklopedia Talmudit*, Vol. 8, s.v. *havhanah*, pp. 102-119
- 14 Vol.3, *Bene Berak*, 1 966, Nos 45-52 Nos 45 and 46 contain the critique Breisch sent in a single letter to Feinstein. No. 47 is a later letter in reply to the defence Feinstein had sent him. Nos. 48-52 contain Feinstein's reply together with Breisch's critical notes
- 15 *Sefer Hasidim*, ed. R. Margalio, Jer, 1973, No 829
- 16 *Divrey Yoel*, Brooklyn, New York, 1983, Nos. 107-1 10, Responsa dated 1964-5
- 17 *Rabbi Moshe Feinstein* by S. Finkleman and R. Schirman, Jer., 1987 p. 1921
- 18 No. 107, the first Responsum in Vol. 2 of the *Divrey Yoel*
- 19 *Maaneh le-Iggerot*, New York, 1973, This book is a curiosity, too, because Schwartz had resort to the same publisher as the one who published Feinstein's works and the work at a superficial glance, looks like an additional Feinstein volume since exactly the same format, type and binding is used for both. See the biography of Feinstein, *op.cit.* p. 192 that the embarrassed publisher consulted Feinstein before publishing the Schwartz book but Feinstein told him to go ahead since his living depended on it
- 20 *Helkat Yaakov*, op. cit. No. 48, beg.
- 21 *Iggerot Moshe*, vol., 6, *Bene Berak*, 1985, No. 32