

OCCASIONAL PAPERS · 2
THE THIRD
FRANK GREEN LECTURE



*World Jewry
Beyond 2000:
The Demographic
Prospects*



SERGIO DELLAPERGOLA

Oxford Centre for
Hebrew and Jewish Studies



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A Changing World

Whether the cross-over date is 1 January 2000 or 2001, humanity is poised on the threshold of the twenty-first century and the third millennium at a time of significant if not dramatic change for the world system.¹ The political equilibrium has shifted, socio-economic trends have become global and, no less significantly, new cultural choices have emerged among the young. These transformations are reshaping the world polity and affecting the daily life and identity of nations, communities and individuals. The changes have impacted also on world Jewry.

Over a short time we have witnessed the fall of the Iron Curtain, the dismemberment of the Soviet Union as a major global power, the reunification of Germany, the revival of religious fundamentalism, the return of 'ethnic cleansing', new waves of mass international migration, the beginnings of a peace process in the Middle East, the Catholic Church's improvement of its relations with the Jewish people marked by its historic recognition of the State of Israel, European monetary union and several other major global and regional changes. Such developments, by raising questions about the future of world society, have also stimulated growing interest and concern about the present and the future development of world Jewry.²

The attitudes of leading specialists towards the state of Jewish population and society, however, reveal deep disagreement. Not only have these major changes provoked uncertainty for the future, but conflict emerges on broader historical and philosophical grounds. For example, a widely read book published in the mid-1980s by Charles

¹ The expression 'world system' defines the global complex of countries and societies, assumed to be related by mutual, meaningful and sometimes conflicting interactions. See I. Wallerstein, *The Modern World System* (New York, 1974, 1980, 1989).

² This concern has led to the convening of numerous international consultations and the appointment of special 'strategic planning' task forces by several major Jewish organizations. See, e.g., S. Eilati (ed.) *The Tribes of Israel Together: A Dialogue with the President of Israel* (Jerusalem, 1996); Institute of Jewish Affairs and American Jewish Committee, *Planning for the Future of European Jewry* (London, 1996).

Silberman, *A Certain People*, delivered a rosy portrayal of American Jewry.³ Silberman described the undisputed success-story of the Jews in the United States, particularly their nearly universal acceptance in American society, their impressive social mobility, economic prosperity and political achievements and anchored his sanguine analysis on a rather optimistic description of United States Jewish demographic trends.⁴ About ten years later, the title of Alan Dershowitz's *The Vanishing American Jew* suggests a mood far from euphoric;⁵ while that of Bernard Wasserstein's *Vanishing Diaspora*—an influential, well-researched analysis of the likely future of European Jewry—also speaks for itself.⁶ Comparing the optimism of the 1980s with the more recent literature reveals a sea change,⁷ for in the later works demographic erosion and cultural assimilation constitute the underlying thread.⁸ Although each analysis refers to a separate Jewish collective, all of them address the challenge to Jewish cultural continuity within open, democratic, non-confrontational societies of the kind in which the majority of Jews now live.

These conflicting visions of the future of the Diaspora—a term about which there is today far less agreement than before⁹—have their counterparts concerning Israeli society. The once predominant paradigms of the ingathering of the exiles, immigrant absorption, fusion of the Diasporas and of nation building based on a Jewish majority, now meet growing competition from alternative, critical or post-Zionist views.¹⁰

³ C. Silberman, *A Certain People: American Jews and Their Lives Today* (New York, 1986).

⁴ The book's demographic chapters draw on the analysis of C. Goldscheider and A. S. Zuckerman, *The Transformation of the Jews* (Chicago, 1984).

⁵ A. M. Dershowitz, *The Vanishing American Jew: In Search of Jewish Identity for the Next Century* (Boston, 1997).

⁶ B. Wasserstein, *Vanishing Diaspora: The Jews in Europe since 1945* (London, 1996).

⁷ See also D. Vital, *The Future of the Jews* (Cambridge, 1990); J. Sacks, *One People? Tradition, Modernity, and Jewish Unity* (London and Washington, 1993).

⁸ For a much earlier expression of very similar concerns, see F. Theilhaber, *Der Untergang der deutschen Juden* (Berlin, 1911).

⁹ Many, especially in the United States, prefer 'World Jewry' to 'the Diaspora' as the counterpart to 'Jews in Israel', but that definition is inadequate as it includes Israeli Jews.

¹⁰ See S. N. Eisenstadt, *The Transformation of Israeli Society; An Essay in Interpretation* (London, 1985); C. Goldscheider, *Israel's Changing Society; Population, Ethnicity, and Development* (Boulder, 1996).

It is our task to review the major social and demographic trends affecting world Jewry, to discuss some of the implications and more likely demographic scenarios emerging from them, and to suggest some general conclusions. It is hard to understand the long-term unfolding of Jewish history and the complexities of contemporary Jewish society without attending to demographic issues. The size and structure of the Jewish collective and the cultural profile of its individual members are intricately interwoven with a long array of socio-demographic transformations. Some of these changes reveal a deep and reciprocal relationship between Jews and society at large, globally and within each region and country. Other changes reflect the perhaps unique character of the Jewish religious, cultural and social experience. It is precisely at the current time of global transformation that demographic patterns become a revealing indicator of the human resources available to cope with the present needs of, and the future challenges faced by, world Jewry. Consequently, this paper will raise issues of interest to Jewish community planners of the twenty-first century. It will also become clear where we stand on the Silberman/Dershowitz/Wasserstein continuum.

Birth, Life and Death of a Sub-Population

From a socio-demographic point of view, Jews constitute a sub-population defined by its attachment to a unique pool of symbolic markers, defined by terms such as values, norms, culture, history, memory, religion, nationality, ethnicity and genealogy. The birth, or ethnogenesis, of such a sub-population—whether the majority or a minority within the total society of a given place—may result from one of four possible processes: (a) immigration of the sub-population to a place where it was not previously present; (b) annexation of a locality where the group was present by another territorial entity where it was not; (c) ideational innovation or split from another existing group; or (d) merger of two or more existing groups generating a new one with its own durable characteristics. The death of a sub-population in a certain place—or ethnoextinction—may result from any of five possible circumstances: (a) emigration of all members of the given group; (b) territorial cession, including all members of the given group; (c) complete assimilation, or loss of identification by all members of the group; (d) extinction due to the excess of deaths over

births; or (c) a particular case of the latter, genocide. Each of these mechanisms can be shown to have operated in the long course of Jewish demographic history.

Clearly, the changing size and internal structure of sub-populations are determined by a complex of biological, social and cultural factors. In the first place, the birth and death rates play a decisive role. Another factor is the movement of people in and out of given areas, or the balance of international and internal migration. But socio-demographic continuity in Jewish and other similar sub-populations is also fundamentally determined by the transmission of group identification from one to the next generation. The significant factor in this respect is the balance of people who choose to join the group and those who consciously or unconsciously secede from it. The ultimate question concerns the willingness and ability of individuals to recognize themselves and to survive as a group.

All socio-demographic events of the kind just mentioned take place at the individual level. It is individuals who are born, marry or do not, move geographically or do not, switch their ideological persuasions or not and ultimately die. It is the cumulative account of these apparently minor and trivial events that builds up into powerful collective trends. But in no way can the broader significance of these events be reduced to the individual sphere, as their desirability, feasibility and eventual occurrence are importantly affected by conditions that operate on all or most members of the given community. Socio-demographic events draw on the symbolic culture, perceptions, norms, values, constraints and opportunities shared by each individual within the group.

The nature, scope and impact of organizations and institutions in a given community should also be considered. These develop generally within the community, although sometimes outside it, with the primary goal of maintaining the group's boundaries, offering security, defending public interests, transmitting the cultural heritage and providing other services of communal importance. Jewish demographic events also reflect individual and communal interactions with the broader society, or more specifically with the constraints and opportunities it generates.¹¹ A balanced analysis should therefore focus both on

¹¹ D. Elazar, *People and Polity—The Organizational Dynamics of World Jewry* (Detroit, 1989).

the main trends developing within the Jewish collective and on the broader scene of societal change, especially in those countries where the majority of Jews live.

The demographic predicament of the Jews—no matter how historically and socially unique—also offers useful lessons and paradigms of a more general interest for population studies and theory at a time of enhanced interest in ethnic identities and their relationship to broader social, political and demographic issues.¹²


Definitions: Core and Enlarged Jewish Populations

No assessment of current and expected Jewish demographic trends is possible without an explanation of 'who is a Jew'. Statistics of Jews have always had to cope with questions of definition and with problems of the completeness and quality of the data. More than ever, researchers are encountering difficulties in defining the target population. While being aware of the importance of normative definitions, the only option for social scientists is to proceed through operative definitions.¹³

The figures reported here will consistently relate to the so-called 'core Jewish population'—unless otherwise stated explicitly (see Figure 1). This concept includes all those who, when asked, identify themselves as Jews; or, if the respondent is a different person in the same household, are identified by him or her as Jews. This is a comprehensive approach that reflects both subjective feelings and community norms and bonds, and reflects attitudes that are looser in the Diaspora than in Israel where personal status is subject to the

¹² The relationship between ethnic identities and population trends has received growing attention in the recent demographic, sociological and political literature. See, e.g., G. J. Goldmann and N. McKenney (eds) *The Measurement of Ethnicity: Science, Politics and Reality* (Washington, 1993); S. DellaPergola, 'Demographic Processes and Their Impact on the Identity and Survival of Minorities', in International Union for the Scientific Study of Population, *Proceedings of the XXIIInd General Population Conference 3* (Montreal, 1993) 89–98; J. L. Rallu, J. Courbage and V. Piché (eds) *Old and New Minorities—Anciennes et nouvelles minorités* (Paris, 1997); S. P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York, 1996).

¹³ S. DellaPergola, 'Modern Jewish Demography', in J. Wertheimer (ed.) *The Modern Jewish Experience: A Reader's Guide* (New York, 1993) 275–90; S. Goldstein and B. A. Kosmin, 'Religious and Ethnic Self-Identification in the United States 1989–90: A Case Study of the Jewish Population', *Ethnic Groups*, 9, pp. 219–45; B. A. Kosmin, 'A Religious Question in the British Census?', *Patterns of Prejudice*, 32: 2, pp. 40–6.

Figure 1. *Schematic Representation of Jewish Population Definition*

ruling of the Ministry of the Interior. Regarding most research conducted in the Diaspora, the ‘core’ definition is wider than halakhic (rabbinic) or other legally binding definitions, and does not depend on a person’s Jewish commitment or behaviour, defined in terms of religiosity, beliefs, knowledge, communal affiliation and so on. It includes all those who converted to Judaism or decided to join the Jewish group informally and declare themselves Jewish, but excludes those of Jewish descent who have formally adopted another religion, as well as those who did not convert out but currently refuse to recognize their Jewishness.

The concept of an ‘enlarged Jewish population’ includes the sum of (a) the core Jewish population, (b) Jews by birth or parentage who do not currently identify as Jews and (c) non-Jewish household members (spouses, children, etc.) who do not declare themselves Jewish, and therefore encompasses significantly more people than the core population. The gap between the number of individuals covered by the enlarged and by the core definitions tends to increase with growing intermarriage.

It is worth recalling that the Law of Return—Israel’s distinctive legal framework for the eligibility and absorption of new immigrants—

extends its provisions to all current Jews, to their Jewish or non-Jewish spouses, their children and grandchildren, and to the spouses of such children and grandchildren. As a result of its three-generational perspective and lateral extension, the Law of Return applies to a population potentially wider than both the core and the enlarged Jewish populations. Indeed, a growing percentage of new immigrants to Israel, especially from the former Soviet Union, are not Jewish, although their percentage is much lower than could be expected based on the composition of the enlarged Jewish population in the countries of origin (see below). The Law of Return, *per se*, does not affect a person's Jewish status, which, as noted, is adjudicated by Israel's Ministry of the Interior and rabbinical authorities. Several thousands of the non-Jewish immigrants have undergone conversion in Israel. In practice, while the Law of Return defines objectively determinable rules for the attribution of certain rights and prerogatives, the initiative for being entitled to its provisions normally stems from people's subjective, individual awareness of belonging and willingness to belong (directly or indirectly) to the Jewish collective.

It clearly follows that the core Jewish population and related concepts depend for their definition largely on self-identification. The juridical Jewish approach to establishing exactly who is Jewish remains the decisive criterion on a normative basis, and may sometimes cause contention among different authorities and groups. But such a systematic approach cannot be followed in the case of surveys or censuses, where decisions must be made quickly and cheaply. Most of the data available on contemporary Jewish populations are therefore based on the willingness of people to declare themselves Jewish or to be the descendants of Jewish parents, even if they are currently agnostic or lacking in any specific group identification.

As a result, the currently estimated 13 million Jews worldwide (see below) are intimately connected to several more million people, some of whom have Jewish origins but are not currently Jewish either because they have changed their identification or because they are the non-Jewish children of intermarried parents. Others are non-Jewish members of intermarried households. These non-Jews share the daily life experience, social and economic concerns and cultural environment of their Jewish partners, so would be included in an enlarged definition of the Jewish community. Still, the distinction between

Jewish and non-Jewish members of this enlarged aggregate has great analytic interest and should not be forgotten.

A Look at Modern Jewish Demographic History

Tradition, Modernization and Population Growth

Figures for the core Jewish population worldwide and in each country, whether accurate or only rough approximations, reflect continually changing trends. Understanding these may provide a better sense of the current and future directions of world Jewish demography.¹⁴ A unique interplay between traditional Jewish culture and community on the one hand, and modernization on the other, lies behind the rapid Jewish population growth between the end of the eighteenth century and the eve of the Second World War.

It is fairly certain that the world Jewish population was quite small during the Middle Ages—in the range of 1 million, plus or minus a few hundred thousand—and grew little throughout the early-modern

¹⁴ General and Jewish population trends in the past can be reconstructed on the basis of a wealth of studies and estimates. Among sources used here for the total population, see: C. McEvedy and R. Jones, *Atlas of World Population History* (Harmondsworth, 1978); J. N. Biraben, 'Essai sur l'évolution du nombre des hommes', *Population*, 34 (1979) 13–25, and periodical estimates and up-datings by the United Nations, lastly: UN, Department for Economic and Social Information and Policy Analysis, Population Division, *World Population Prospects; The 1996 Revision* (New York, 1997). Regarding Jewish demographic history, see especially A. Ruppin, *The Jews of To-Day* (New York, 1913); A. Ruppin, *Die Soziologie der Juden* (Berlin, 1930–1); J. Lestschinsky, 'Die Umsiedlung und Umschichtung des jüdischen Volkes im Laufe des letzten Jahrhunderts', *Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv* 30 (1929) 123–56; S. W. Baron, 'Population', *Encyclopedia Judaica* (1971) 13: 866–903; U. O. Schmelz, 'A Guide to Jewish Population Studies, in U. O. Schmelz and P. Glikson (eds) *Jewish Population Studies 1961–1968* (Jerusalem and London, 1970) 11–94; R. Bachi, *Population Trends of World Jewry* (Jerusalem, 1976); R. Bachi, *The Population of Israel* (Jerusalem, 1977); U. O. Schmelz, 'Jewish Survival: The Demographic Factors', *American Jewish Year Book* 81 (1981) 61–117; S. DellaPergola, *La trasformazione demografica della diaspora ebraica* (Torino, 1983); S. DellaPergola, 'Some Effects of Religion on Population Trends: the Case of the Jews', *Pro Mundi Vita Studies* 5 (Brussels, 1988) 40–8; S. DellaPergola, 'Major Demographic Trends of World Jewry: The Last Hundred Years', in B. Bonnè-Tamir and A. Adam (eds) *Genetic Diversity Among Jews: Diseases and Markers at the DNA Level* (New York, 1992) 3–30; S. DellaPergola, 'Changing Cores and Peripheries: Fifty Years in Socio-demographic Perspective', in R. S. Wistrich (ed.) *Terms of Survival: The Jewish World since 1945* (London, 1995) 13–43.

Table 1. *Total and Jewish Population Estimates, World and Europe, 1700–1940*

Year	Total population		Jewish population	
	World	Europe ^a	World	Europe ^a
Absolute numbers (millions)				
1700	680.0	125.0	1.1	0.7
1800	954.0	195.0	2.5	2.0
1900	1,634.0	422.0	10.6	8.7
1940	2,295.0	575.0	16.5	9.5
Ratios of population size				
1800/1700	1.40	1.56	2.27	2.81
1900/1800	1.71	2.16	4.24	4.35
1940/1900	1.40	1.36	1.56	1.09

a. Including the whole territory of the FSU.

Sources: total population: McEvedy and Jones (1978), Biraben (1979), United Nations (1997); Jewish population: Lestschinsky (1929), Baron (1971), Schmelz (1970), Bachi (1977), DellaPergola (1983), (see n. 14).

period. Ups and downs reflected periodical expulsions, enforced conversions, epidemics or outbreaks of anti-Jewish violence.

With the gradual improvement of conditions during the eighteenth century, world Jewry began to grow significantly. It stood at about 2.5 million in around 1800, but accelerating growth rates during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries brought it to about 10.6 million in 1900, and to an historical maximum of about 16.5 million on the eve of the Holocaust (see Table 1). Such a rate of increase—producing a Jewish population growth of more than twice during the eighteenth century and over four times during the nineteenth—is quite exceptional in modern demographic history. The world total population grew by 40 per cent during the eighteenth century and by 70 per cent during the nineteenth. Most of the Jewish population growth occurred in Eastern Europe, where rates of increase exceeded those of the total populations of Russia and England.

The speed of Jewish demographic development was a consequence of comparatively low mortality and high fertility.¹⁵ Jewish infant

¹⁵ U. O. Schmelz, *Infant and Early Childhood Mortality among the Jews of the Diaspora* (Jerusalem, 1971); Bachi, *Population Trends* (see n. 14); DellaPergola, 'Major Demographic Trends' (see n. 14).

mortality in particular was significantly lower than that among non-Jews in the same environments. During the early stages of the epidemiological transition, Jewish health-oriented rituals most likely provided certain relative advantages, resulting from provisions concerning personal hygiene, nutrition, family care and community support for the needy. Differences between Jews and society at large relating to educational levels, urbanization and employment played a more significant role probably at a later stage. Lower Jewish mortality thus resulted more from standards of living than from progress in medicine, and merely anticipated the process of mortality reduction, which was being translated into longer life expectancies and faster population increase in surrounding populations, at least in Europe.

The demographic consequences of low mortality were multiplied by the centrality of the nuclear family in Jewish society. This is demonstrated by high rates of marriage, often enhanced by professional intermediaries, nearly universal endogamy, a supportive attitude toward remarriage in cases of divorce or widowhood and fairly high Jewish fertility levels. Eventually, however, many of the very social factors responsible for the early decline in Jewish mortality also stimulated the earlier beginning and quicker evolution of the transition to lower levels of Jewish fertility. The early twentieth century still saw a rapidly growing Jewish population, but the pace of growth was declining and lagging behind that of the total population.

Direct and Indirect Impact of the Shoah

The 1930s witnessed the end of Jewish population growth in Europe and were followed by the tragic loss of 6 million—still the most reasonable estimate for those killed in the Shoah. During the fifty years since 1945, however, the Jewish population did not recover or even approach its prewar size.

Before examining the contemporary trends, let us consider what might be defined as a historical-demographic fiction, but which, I believe, can be helpful in understanding current and future Jewish population issues. The question is: what might have happened to Jewish demography had the Holocaust not taken place? I recognize the problems implicit in formulating a response and the shaky ground onto which it leads one. Yet, the issue cannot be wholly dismissed.

Elsewhere I have provided a detailed listing of the demographic and

Table 2. *World Jewish Population Projections Assuming the Shoah had not Occurred (Millions)*

Year	Actual Jewish population	Alternative projection assumptions		
		Low fertility	Very low fertility	Post-Shoah growth rates
1940	16.5	16.5	16.5	16.5
1950	11.4	18.5	18.5	17.9
1960	12.2	21.9	20.9	19.2
1970	12.6	25.2	22.8	19.8
1980	12.8	28.1	24.6	20.1
1990	12.9	31.0	26.5	20.3
2000	13.0	32.8	26.5	20.4

Source: adapted from DellaPergola (1996), (see n. 16).

non-demographic factors involved in the catastrophe of European Jewry,¹⁶ and the three alternative population projections presented in Table 2 are based on conservative extrapolations of demographic trends developing during the 1920s and 1930s in Europe. Very cautious assumptions were posited regarding the political, social, economic and demographic circumstances that might have obtained had the tragic losses not occurred. The 1940 Jewish population was extrapolated under the following alternative assumptions: (a) moderate to low fertility levels after the Second World War; (b) extremely low fertility levels; and, (c) for the sake of establishing a minimum estimate, applying to the prewar Jewish population estimate the actual postwar growth rates—thus incorporating the negative after-effects of the Shoah.

By simply adding the lost 6 million, the world's Jewish population would now amount to nearly 20 million. But the Jewish population in the late 1930s was still relatively young, and that large young section of the Jewish people would probably have reproduced and grown over the subsequent three to five decades. If we incorporate the population growth implicit in the prewar situation, world Jewry might have reached between 26 and 32 million souls during the late 1990s,

¹⁶ S. DellaPergola, 'Between Science and Fiction: Notes on the Demography of the Holocaust', *Holocaust and Genocide Studies* 10:1 (Spring 1996) 34–51.

instead of the 13 million of today. Thanks to the strong demographic momentum, the Jewish population could have been expected to continue growing even in the face of a significant decline in fertility. An ageing process would indeed have occurred, but at a slower pace and much later than actually occurred (see Table 2).

Clearly, in order to calculate the present and future Jewish population, it is not only the 6 million direct losses that should be kept in mind, but also those who were not born because of conditions during the Second World War and their 6 to 12 million unborn children and grandchildren. What remains is the residuum of a people that might have existed under historical circumstances that, it should be stressed, will now never materialize. While the attempt to reconstruct the potential demography of a Jewish people that will never be is methodologically sound, its relevance lies not so much in the numbers as in the message to future generations.

How Many Jews and Where

After the Second World War

Let us now return to the real world of postwar Jewish demography. An overview of the major trends, giving separate estimates for the Jewish populations of Israel and the Diaspora, is presented in Table 3 and Figure 2.¹⁷

By 1945 the world Jewish population had been reduced to about 11 million. It recovered somewhat during the 1950s, reaching a level of close to 12.5 million by the mid-1960s, 12.8 million in 1980 and an estimated 13,025,000 at the end of 1996. In other words, it took about 13 years to add 1 million Jews to the post-Shoah total, but another 38 years to add a second million. Not only was world Jewry far from approaching its pre-Shoah size of 16.5 million, but the global increase of Jewish population slowed down over the years and tended to reach zero or negative population growth towards the end of the 1980s. Very modest increases during the 1990s reflected a temporary echo-effect of the postwar baby-boom, as well as some re-identification, returns or conversions of those whose Jewish identification had

¹⁷ S. DellaPergola, 'World Jewish Population 1996', *American Jewish Year Book* 98 (1998).

Table 3. *World, Israel and Diaspora Jewish Population Estimates, 1945–1996*


Year	Jewish population ^a (millions)			Average yearly rate of change (%)		
	World	Israel	Diaspora	World	Israel	Diaspora
1945	11.000	0.565	10.435			
1950	11.373	1.203	10.170	0.67	17.45	-0.51
1955	11.800	1.591	10.209	0.74	5.75	0.08
1960	12.160	1.911	10.249	0.60	3.73	0.08
1965	12.500	2.299	10.211	0.55	3.77	-0.07
1970	12.633	2.582	10.051	0.21	2.35	-0.32
1975	12.742	2.959	9.783	0.17	2.76	-0.54
1980	12.840	3.283	9.557	0.15	2.10	-0.47
1985	12.871	3.517	9.354	0.05	1.39	-0.43
1990	12.869	3.947	8.922	-0.003	2.33	-0.94
1995	12.988	4.480	8.508	0.18	2.56	-0.95
1996	13.025	4.568	8.457	0.28	1.96	-0.60

^a Source: Israel: Central Bureau of Statistics; Diaspora and world: DellaPergola (1998), (see n. 17).

been marginal or non-existent. This was connected with mass emigration from Eastern Europe.

World Jewry's current rate of increase is very close to nil, but the overall stability is the product of two entirely different but mutually compensating trends. The world Jewish population is split between two contrasting, if not conflicting, sets of demographic determinants and consequences: Jews in the State of Israel and those in the rest of the world—the Diaspora, if that term can be agreed upon. One component, currently including just above a third of the world total, operates in the context of the Jewish majority of its own sovereign state. The other component, about two-thirds of world Jewry, operates as a plurality of minorities of different sizes which constitute small to minuscule shares of the total populations of their respective countries.

Since 1945 the quantitative gap between these two Jewish populations has tended to decline. The most notable Jewish demographic change since the late 1940s has been the emergence of Israel as one of the largest and most viable centres of Jewish life in history. The Jewish

Figure 2. *World, Diaspora and Israeli Jewish Population, 1945–1996*

population in Israel (formerly Palestine) grew from approximately 500,000 in 1945 to about 4.6 million at the end of 1996, and its share of world Jewry grew from less than 5 to over 35 per cent. The total Jewish population outside Israel shrank from just under 10.5 million in 1945 to less than 8.5 million in 1996. Israel's Jewish population, in other words, grew by more than 2 million between 1945 and 1970, and by almost another 2 million between 1970 and 1996. Diaspora Jewry diminished by about 400,000 between 1945 and 1970, and by another 1.6 million between 1970 and 1996. These changes reflect in part the net transfer of over 2 million Jews from the Diaspora to Israel over the period. A substantial part of these population changes, however, is related to a very different balance of Jewish births and deaths, as well as the contrasting impact of accessions to and secessions from Judaism. Especially since the 1970s, these factors produced further substantial population increases in Israel, against declines in the aggregate of other Jewish communities.

Geographical Distribution

A detailed overview of world Jewish population distribution at the end of 1996 appears in Table 4, which also presents a synopsis of the major sources of data available for the fifteen largest Jewish populations, including national population censuses and Jewish surveys such as the 1990 US National Jewish Population Survey (NJPS).¹⁸ Our estimates take into account the baseline provided by these sources, but also reflect a critical assessment of the quality of the data, as well as any vital, migratory and identification changes since the last time of data collection.¹⁹

Since Israel's independence in 1948, significant changes have affected the geographical distribution of world Jewry and the relative weight of communities in different regions of the world. The major Jewish population centres in the Middle East and North Africa have been depleted through mass emigration to Israel and to Western countries, and a similar trend was developing in Eastern Europe in the late 1990s. Jews in Moslem countries numbered over 850,000 in 1948, but now stand at about 20,000, while the Jewish population of the former Soviet Union declined from an estimated 2,375,000 in 1948 to 595,000 at the end of 1996 and that of other East European and Balkan countries fell from 850,000 in 1948 to just over 100,000 currently. The total in Latin America also diminished from 525,000 in 1948 to 431,000 in 1996, while that in African countries south of the Sahara, mainly South Africa, declined from 120,000 to 96,000. On the other hand, the Jewish population in the major Western countries tended to be stable or to increase. In the United States and Canada the estimated total grew from 5,235,000 in 1948 to 6,062,000 in 1996; in Western Europe, from 850,000 to 1,043,000; and in Oceania, from 40,000 in 1948 to the current 96,000.

¹⁸ B. A. Kosmin, S. Goldstein, J. Waksberg, N. Lerer, A. Keysar and J. Scheckner, *Highlights of the CJF 1990 National Jewish Population Survey* (New York, 1991).

¹⁹ For a country-by-country summary list and evaluation of sources, see S. DellaPergola, 'Sociodemographic Surveys of World Jewry in the 1990s: Aims, Techniques, Implications', in U. O. Schmelz and S. DellaPergola (eds) *Papers in Jewish Demography 1989* (Jerusalem, 1993) 14–23. A systematic overview and updating on world Jewish population appears yearly in 'World Jewish Population', *American Jewish Year Book* (New York). After 1981 this analysis has been carried out by the late Professor U. O. Schmelz and by this author at the Division of Jewish Demography and Statistics of the A. Harman Institute of Contemporary Jewry, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem.


Table 4. *Jewish Populations of Major Countries According to Continent: Sources and Estimates*

Continents and major countries	1996 estimates ^a	Percent	Last official census	Year	Last Jewish survey ^b	Year
World total	13,025,000	100.0				
North America	6,062,000	46.5				
United States	5,700,000	43.8	—	—	5,515,000	1990
Canada	362,000	2.8	356,300	1991	—	—
			351,700 ^c	1996	—	—
Latin America	431,000	3.3				
Argentina	205,000	1.6	320,000	1960	—	—
Brazil	100,000	0.8	86,400	1991	—	—
Mexico	40,700	0.3	62,300	1991	40,000	1991
West Europe	1,043,400	8.0				
France	524,000	4.0	—	—	530,000	1988
United Kingdom	291,000	2.2	—	—	308,000	1986
					285,000	1995
Germany	70,000	0.5	32,300	1987	—	—
Belgium	31,700	0.2	—	—	—	—
East Europe	648,300	5.0				
Russia	340,000	2.6	408,000	1994	—	—
Ukraine	155,000	1.2	487,300	1989	—	—
Hungary	53,500	0.4	134,000	1948	—	—
Asia	4,636,300	35.6				
Israel	4,567,700	35.1	4,459,700	1995	—	—
Africa	104,400	0.8				
South Africa	94,000	0.7	65,406	1991	100,000	1991
Oceania	99,600	0.8				
Australia	95,000	0.7	79,805	1996	—	—

^a Core Jewish populations. Data for 15 largest Jewish populations are reported separately. Source: DellaPergola (1998), (see n. 17).

^b Or other estimates based on Jewish nationwide data.

^c Ethnic identification only.

Figure 3. *World Jewish Population, by Main Countries, 1996*

In the course of time, the Jewish population has become overwhelmingly concentrated in a relatively small number of countries. Two countries dominate world Jewry: the United States with about 5,700,000 persons (43.8 per cent of the world total) and the State of Israel with 4,568,000 (35.1 per cent) at the end of 1996 (see Figure 3). The remaining 2,757,000 (21.2 per cent) are highly dispersed and for a variety of analytic and organizational purposes may nowadays deserve the designation of a Jewish 'third world', a tongue-in-cheek description in view of the fact that this is in reality a highly sophisticated and socio-economically mobile population, mostly concentrated in ten to fifteen major national Jewish communities. Four countries alone include more than half of all non-US and non-Israeli Jews: France (with an estimated 524,000 Jews in 1996), followed by Canada (362,000), the Russian Republic (340,000) and the United Kingdom (291,000).²⁰ Further important Jewish communities are to be found in Argentina (estimated at 205,000 in 1996), Ukraine (155,000), Brazil

²⁰ A report released after the present paper was completed estimates the UK Jewish population at 282,500 in 1996. See M. Schmool and F. Cohen, *A Profile of British Jewry: Patterns and Trends at the Turn of the Century* (London, 1998).

(100,000), Australia (95,000), South Africa (94,000) and Germany (70,000).

Trends of growth, stability or decline in these major communities were quite variable. Republics of the Former Soviet Union (FSU) have undergone a significant process of Jewish population decline which is not yet complete. Our end-1996 estimate of the total Jewish population in the FSU was 595,000, compared with 1,480,000 according to the last official population census of the USSR carried out in January 1989.²¹ The loss of nearly 1 million, or two-thirds of the original estimate, may be explained mostly by the migration which began toward the end of 1989. Some of the FSU republics, primarily Russia and to a minor extent the Baltics,²² have been able to retain a substantial and today better-organized Jewish presence, while others, such as Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova in Europe and the republics in the Caucasus and Central Asia, experienced quicker and more massive decline.

Among the Western countries, France,²³ Canada,²⁴ Brazil²⁵ and Australia²⁶ have quite stable Jewish populations. A fairly good understanding of the demography of British Jewry is made possible by the statistics regularly collected and published by the Community Research Unit of the Board of Deputies in London, which has more recently been supplemented by investigations conducted by the

²¹ This figure includes about 30,000 Tats (Mountain Jews) that were not included as Jews in the original census reports. See Goskomstat SSSR, *Vestnik Statistiki* 10 (1990) 69–71. The historical demographic background is presented in M. Altshuler, *Soviet Jewry since the Second World War: Population and Social Structure* (Westport, 1987).

²² S. and A. Goldstein, *Lithuanian Jewry 1993: A Demographic and Sociocultural Profile* (Jerusalem, 1997).

²³ D. Bensimon and S. DellaPergola, *La population juive de France: socio-démographie et identité* (Jerusalem and Paris, 1984); E. H. Cohen, *L'Etude et l'éducation juive en France ou l'avenir d'une communauté* (Paris, 1991).

²⁴ J. L. Torczyner, S. L. Brotman, K. Viragh and G. J. Goldmann, *Demographic Challenges Facing Canadian Jewry; Initial Findings from the 1991 Census* (Montreal, 1993).

²⁵ IBGE, *Censo demográfico do Brazil* (Rio de Janeiro, 1997); D. Sasson, *A comunidade judaica do Rio de Janeiro; Metodologia da pesquisa* (Rio de Janeiro, 1997).

²⁶ W. D. Rubinstein, 'The Demography of the Australian Jewish Community 1981', *IJA Research Report* (Melbourne, 1986); J. Goldlust, *The Jews of Melbourne; A Report of the Findings of the Jewish Community Survey, 1991* (Melbourne, 1993); S. Encel and N. Moss, *Sydney Jewish Community Demographic Profile* (Sydney, 1995).

Institute for Jewish Policy Research in London.²⁷ While I take sole responsibility for the above estimate of Anglo-Jewry, it is clear that, from the 1970s and possibly before, Jews in the United Kingdom have shown a consistent excess of recorded deaths over the estimated number of births, a trend shared by most other European²⁸ and Latin American countries²⁹ with the exception of Mexico.³⁰

Looking at the changes over the last quarter-century, world Jewry grew from 12,633,000 in 1970 to 13,025,000 in 1996, a modest overall growth of 3 per cent, or an average rate of increase of 0.12 per cent per annum (see Table 5). The Jewish population in the United States increased by an estimated 300,000 (6 per cent), less than might have been expected considering the substantial numbers of Jews who moved there, but the internal interplay of demographic, social and cultural forces balanced out much of the expected population growth (see below).³¹ The Jewish population in Israel increased by 77 per cent over that 26-year period. Diaspora countries where the Jewish population clearly expanded, mostly due to immigration, were Canada (27 per cent increase) and Australia (46 per cent). On the other hand, the former Soviet republics of Russia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Belarus and Moldova all witnessed declines of between 50 and 90 per cent over the quarter-century, due mainly to massive emigration complemented by internal erosion produced by local demographic processes.³² Several

²⁷ M. Schmool, *Report of Community Statistics* (London, annual publication); S. Miller, M. Schmool and A. Lerman, *Social and Political Attitudes of British Jews: Some Key Findings of the JPR Survey* (London, 1996).

²⁸ S. DellaPergola, 'Jews in the European Community: Sociodemographic Trends and Challenges', *American Jewish Year Book* 93 (1993) 25–82.

²⁹ U. O. Schmelz and S. DellaPergola, 'The Demography of Latin American Jewry', *American Jewish Year Book* 85 (1985) 51–102; S. DellaPergola, 'Demographic Trends of Latin American Jewry', in J. Laikin Elkin and G. W. Merks (eds) *The Jewish Presence in Latin America* (Boston, 1987) 85–133.

³⁰ S. DellaPergola and S. Lerner, *La población judía de México: perfil demográfico, social y cultural* (Mexico and Jerusalem, 1995).

³¹ U. O. Schmelz and S. DellaPergola, *Basic Trends in American Jewish Demography* (New York, 1988); S. Goldstein, 'Profile of American Jewry: Insights from the 1990 National Jewish Population Survey', *American Jewish Year Book* 92 (1992) 77–174.

³² M. Tolts, 'Jews in the Russian Republic since the Second World War: the Dynamics of Demographic Erosion', in International Union for the Scientific Study of Population, *Proceedings of the XXIInd General Population Conference* (Montreal, 1993) 3:99–111; E. Andreev, 'Jews in the Households in Russia', in S. DellaPergola and J. Even (eds) *Papers in Jewish Demography 1997* (Jerusalem, forthcoming).

Table 5. *Largest Jewish Populations, 1970 and 1996*^a

Country	1970	1996	Change 1970-96, no.	Change 1970-96, %
World	12,633,000	13,025,000	+392,000	+3
USA	5,400,000	5,700,000	+300,000	+6
Israel	2,582,000	4,568,000	+1,986,000	+77
France	530,000	524,000	-6,000	-1
Canada	286,000	362,000	+76,000	+27
Russia ^b	816,000	340,000	-476,000	-58
UK	390,000	291,000	-99,000	-25
Argentina	282,000	205,000	-77,000	-27
Ukraine	777,000	155,000	-622,000	-80
Brazil	90,000	100,000	+10,000	+11
Australia	65,000	95,000	+30,000	+46
South Africa	118,000	94,000	-24,000	-20
Germany	30,000	70,000	+40,000	+133
Hungary	70,000	54,000	-17,000	-24
Mexico	35,000	41,000	+6,000	+16
Belgium	35,000	32,000	-3,000	-9
Belarus	148,000	23,000	-125,000	-84
Uzbekistan	103,000	14,000	-89,000	-86
Iran	72,000	13,000	-60,000	-83
Moldova	98,000	8,000	-90,000	-92

a. 15 largest populations at each date in **bold**.

b. Including Tats.

communities, such as the UK, Argentina, South Africa³³ and Hungary, display persistent though much less extreme erosion, due partly to migration and partly to a continuing excess of deaths over births. Among the more stable communities were France, Brazil, Mexico and Belgium. All in all, the Jewish community with the fastest rate of growth since 1970 was Germany, which more than doubled due to significant immigration from the FSU. But it is still a relatively small population and the impact of its absolute growth cannot be compared to that recorded in Israel.

As noted, all these estimates refer to the concept of a core Jewish

³³ A. A. Dubb, *The Jewish Population of South Africa; The 1991 Sociodemographic Survey* (Cape Town, 1994).

population, and substantial margins of variation may be introduced when the enlarged Jewish population is considered, including non-Jewish household members. In the United States in 1990 there were 5.5 million Jews according to the core definition, compared with 8.2 million according to the enlarged definition—a difference of 49 per cent.³⁴ In the Russian Republic in 1989 there were 551,000 Jews according to the core definition and 892,000 according to the enlarged definition—a difference of 62 per cent.³⁵ Clearly, Jewish continuity will eventually be determined on the basis of the core population. However, the relevance of enlarged data for processes such as migration to Israel makes it important to monitor the enlarged population as well. Non-Jews actually constituted a growing percentage of all new immigrants from the former Soviet Union, estimated at 25 to 30 percent of the total during the late 1990s.

Jews in the World System

The changes in geographical distribution over the last generation may best be understood in terms of the intensive and complex relationship that exists between Jewish communities and contemporary society at large. One way of proceeding is to try to relate the Jewish presence—expressed in absolute numbers and as a percentage of the total population—to major social and economic indicators in the countries, regions and provinces where they live. The question is: do Jews move and redistribute at random, or do their mobility-patterns reflect the main instrumental forces that operate in society at large? This question is important if we wish to advance toward an understanding of the present and to predict future trends.

Three different sets of data provide a first partial answer (see Table 6). They refer to the geographical distribution of Jews in, respectively, 160 countries globally,³⁶ about 70 different economic regions within

³³ A. A. Dubb, *The Jewish Population of South Africa; The 1991 Sociodemographic Survey* (Cape Town, 1994).

³⁴ Kosmin *et al.*, *Highlights* (see n. 18).

³⁵ M. Tolts, 'Demographic Trends Among the Jews in the Three Slavic Republics of the Former USSR: A Comparative Analysis', in S. DellaPergola and J. Even (eds) *Papers in Jewish Demography 1993 in Memory of U.O. Schmelz* (Jerusalem, 1997) 147–75.

³⁶ M. L. Lévy, 'Tous le pays du monde', *Population et Sociétés* 326 (1997); Schmelz and DellaPergola, 'World Jewish Population' (see n. 19).

the European Union³⁷ and in the 50 federal states of the United States.³⁸ The Jewish and total populations of these countries, economic regions and states were related to the degree of economic development in each area. In each instance the geographical units were first sorted by level of economic development and then subdivided into five groups, or quintiles, each with the same number of geographical units. Quintile one was the highest ranked and quintile five the weakest. During the early 1990s about 89 per cent of Jews globally lived in the highest ranked quintile of countries, including most Western nations and the State of Israel, whereas less than 1 per cent lived in the bottom fifth. Over 59 per cent of Jews in the European Union lived in the top fifth of economic regions, against 1 per cent in the bottom fifth, while 68 per cent of Jews in the United States lived in the top fifth of states, against 1 per cent in the bottom fifth.

The pattern of Jewish distribution according to the level of development of the environment, is thus strikingly consistent and statistically significant, passing from the densest in the wealthier and more sophisticated areas to the scantiest in the poorer and more backward areas. The Index of Dissimilarity in Table 6 measures the difference between Jewish and total population distributions. The results clearly indicate that dissimilarity is directly related to the magnitude of existing gaps within the geographical systems considered. Thus, the degree of Jewish concentration in better locations and the magnitude of differences between Jewish and total-population distribution are far greater among countries worldwide than among states in the US. Over time, the more powerful locales were able to draw Jews from the weaker ones through international or internal migration. The link between the presence of Jews and the existence of certain basic socio-economic and cultural conditions seems to be broadly the same, regardless of the geographical level chosen for

³⁷ The data refer to the 12 countries which constituted the European Union before its expansion to 15 countries. See also S. DellaPergola, 'An Overview of the Demographic Trends of European Jews', in J. Webber (ed.) *Jewish Identities in the New Europe* (London, 1994) 57-73.

³⁸ US Bureau of the Census, *Statistical Abstract of the United States* (1992); B. A. Kosmin and J. Scheckner, 'Jewish Population in the United States, 1992', *American Jewish Year Book* 93 (1993) 192-212.

Table 6. *Estimates of Total and Jewish Population Distribution, by Level of Development of Regions of Residence—World, European Union and United States, Early 1990s*

Quintiles of regions, by economic development	World			European Union			United States		
	Total	Jews	Jews per 1000 pop.	Total	Jews	Jews per 1000 pop.	Total	Jews	Jews per 1000 pop.
	160	69	50	341	1.0	2.9	248	5.7	23.0
N. of regions ^a	5,500	12.9		100.0	100.0	2.9	100.0	100.0	23.0
Population ^b	100.0	100.0	2.3	100.0	100.0	2.9	100.0	100.0	23.0
Total percent	16.5	88.5	12.6	22.2	59.4	7.9	33.7	67.6	46.1
1 (highest)	14.2	9.6	1.6	27.2	19.1	2.1	22.5	22.0	22.6
2	6.9	1.6	0.5	19.5	10.0	2.8	19.9	6.9	7.9
3	53.9	0.3	0.0	17.6	1.5	0.2	12.4	2.3	4.4
4	8.5	0.0	0.0	13.5	1.0	0.2	11.5	1.2	2.3
5 (lowest)									
Index of dissimilarity	0.720			0.417			0.339		

^a For each series of data, geographical divisions were classified according to available socio-economic indicators. Geographical units were sorted into five groups (quintiles) each with the same number of units. Geographical divisions were as follows: *World*: countries; *European Union*: primary statistical regions; *United States*: states (excluding the District of Columbia).

^b Millions.

analysis. This clearly indicates the effective reading of the changing map of opportunities on the part of a Jewish population generally urban, highly educated and quite specialized in its professional activities. But the data can also be interpreted as indicating the material and functional dependency of a Jewish presence on the situation of society at large, whose major changes are generally far beyond the control of the Jewish community.

Another indicator of Jewish sensitivity to global market forces is the overwhelming concentration in major urban areas resulting from intensive international and internal migrations (see Table 7). The extraordinary urbanization of Jews is illustrated by the fact that in 1996, twenty metropolitan areas worldwide had an estimated population of 100,000 Jews or more who altogether comprised about 70 per cent of the total world Jewish population.³⁹ Over half of world Jewry (7,597,000, or 58 per cent) lived in only ten large metropolitan areas: New York (including Northern New Jersey), Los Angeles (including Orange, Riverside and Ventura Counties), Miami-Fort Lauderdale, Philadelphia, Chicago and Boston in the US; the Paris Region in France; and the extended Tel Aviv, Haifa and Jerusalem areas in Israel.

In these and many other centres of world economic and cultural significance, large numbers of Jews enjoy favourable and perhaps unprecedented standards of living and can bring to bear high levels of professional specialization. But these are also places where Jews face the challenge of more intensive competition with, and easy access to, alternative non-Jewish cultures and social networks. At least in the Diaspora, Jewish cultural continuity appears to be more problematical precisely where Jews are physically more secure and where socio-economic achievement is more easily attainable.

The fact, therefore, that an unprecedented share of the global Jewish population has concentrated itself in the more economically developed and politically stable parts of the world augurs well for the Jews in question and sets the scenario and expected rules for possible geographical changes in the future. It also denotes the substantial dependency of the Jewish minority on the favourable conditions created by the majority. The present situation is radically different from the one that prevailed during most of Jewish history, when Jews were tolerated or discriminated against and often retained hopes for changes

³⁹ DellaPergola, 'World Jewish Population, 1996' (see n. 19).

Table 7. *Metropolitan Areas with the Largest Jewish Populations, End 1996*

Rank	Metro Area ^a	Country	Jewish population	% share of world's Jews
1	Tel Aviv ^{b, c}	Israel	2,400,000	18.4
2	New York ^d	US	1,937,000	14.9
3	Haifa ^b	Israel	650,000	5.0
4	Los Angeles ^c	US	590,000	4.5
5	Jerusalem ^f	Israel	550,000	4.2
6	Miami– FortLauderdale	US	382,000	2.9
7	Paris ^g	France	310,000	2.4
8	Philadelphia ^h	US	280,000	2.1
9	Chicago	US	263,000	2.0
10	Boston	US	235,000	1.8
11	San Francisco	US	216,000	1.7
12	London ⁱ	United Kingdom	210,000	1.6
13	Buenos Aires	Argentina	178,000	1.4
14	Washington ^j	US	166,000	1.3
15	Toronto	Canada	166,000	1.3
16	W.Palm Beach– Boca Raton	US	151,000	1.2
17	Beersheba ^k	Israel	143,000	1.1
18	Moscow ^l	Russia	120,000	0.9
19	Baltimore ^m	US	105,000	0.8
20	Montreal	Canada	100,000	0.8

^a Most metropolitan areas include extended inhabited territory and several municipal authorities around the central city. Definitions vary by country.

^b Area as newly defined in the 1995 Population Census.

^c Including Netanya and Ashdod, both with over 100,000 Jews, that previously appeared separately.

^d Including areas in New Jersey and Connecticut.

^e Including Orange County, Riverside, San Bernardino, Ventura County.

^f Adapted from data supplied by the Jerusalem Municipality, Division of Strategic Planning and Research.

^g Departments 75, 77, 78, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95.

^h Including areas in New Jersey and Delaware.

ⁱ Greater London and contiguous postcode areas.

^j Including areas in Maryland and Virginia.

^k Central city only. Our estimate from total population data.

^l Territory administered by City Council.

^m Including Howard County.

Source: DellaPergola (1998), (see n. 17).

in society that would benefit their political and social status. Under the more stable and attractive present conditions, Jewish interest increasingly coincides with that of the societal order. Hence, at the end of a long transformation which has brought with it political emancipation and economic achievement, Jews find themselves in a more conservative state of mind concerning their position within society at large.

Determinants of Transformation


In the light of this general picture of world Jewish population size and composition, the major underlying factors of demographic change will now be examined in greater detail. In analysing some of the socio-demographic processes, it should be kept in mind that the minority-majority antithesis is a powerful and pervasive factor in Diaspora-Israel differentials. Three determinants of transformation deserve special attention: international migration, socio-economic mobility and changes in family structure.

International Migration

Jewish geographical mobility,⁴⁰ which contributed to the anti-Jewish myth of the wandering Jew according to which they were a restless and rootless people, has been a factor of significant change in Jewish society. But attention should be paid to the political and socio-economic conditions that stimulated frequent geographical mobility: a hostile environment, fuelled by old anti-Semitic prejudice and also by rapid Jewish population growth, created highly unstable and dangerous conditions, the response to which was—when feasible—mass and non-selective emigration.

Since 1880—over about 120 years—more than 8 million Jews migrated from one continent to another (see Figure 4). This includes movement to and from Israel, but not within continents, especially Europe. About 4 million Jews migrated between 1881 and the eve of the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948, and another 4 million between 1948 and 1996. Over this period, Jewish migration was

⁴⁰ For a more detailed overview of the topics covered in this section, see S. DellaPergola, 'The Global Context of Migration to Israel', in E. Leshem and J. Shuval (eds) *Immigration to Israel: Sociological Perspectives* (New Brunswick, 1998).

Figure 4. *Jewish International Migration, 1880-1996*

dominated by negative (push) factors and by the variable availability of ports of entry. Both in absolute terms and in relation to the overall pool of Jewish population, probably only the Irish during the nineteenth century had a higher ratio of migrants among the population available at origin.

Modern international migration of Jews has taken place in an uninterrupted series of waves prompted by political and economic crises affecting Jewish communities in their regions of origin. The three major moments were (a) the movement of Jews from the Russian and Habsburg empires to the West, and especially to the United States at a time of nearly unrestricted mass migration to America that peaked in 1905-6; (b) the establishment of the State of Israel, with the unrestricted opening of its gates to Jewish immigration, followed by mass migration during the late 1940s and early 1950s that peaked in 1949-51; and (c) the great exodus from the FSU since the last months of 1989 that peaked in 1990-1. The last wave is not less significant in absolute numbers than the two preceding ones.

Looking at these major cycles, interspersed with minor ones over nearly 120 years, no single breaking point or pattern of gradual change can be detected, as would be expected in the case either of revolutionary shift in the world order, or in a context of modernization, democratization and the gradual improvement of world society. What appears is rather a general pattern of 'stable instability' or 'unstable stability'.

The major wave-like migration pattern seems to be the product not of mere chance, but rather of a complex array of more general factors. While simplistic fascination with historical cycles should be avoided, several leading scholars have long hypothesized the existence of economic and political cycles at the global level.⁴¹ Periodic conflicts between major powers and sharp discontinuities in economic development have tended to affect the world geo-political balance and the redistribution of areas of influence across the world system. The consequences of these global changes eventually percolate down to regions, countries, provinces, communities and individuals. Especially when Jews fulfilled a mediating role in rigidly stratified multi-ethnic countries, their position in society was deeply affected by the disruption of long-established mechanisms of interaction between Jews and other social, political and ethno-religious groups. The periodic re-emergence of the urgent need to emigrate clearly testifies to the sensitivity of Jewish communities to, or even dependency on, a much broader and complex international thread of events throughout history.

The choice of countries of destination among Jewish migrants was consistently compatible with the rational preference for economically more developed and politically more secure places. Thus, Jewish geography shifted from locations in semi-peripheral and peripheral countries in Asia, Africa, Eastern Europe and Latin America, towards more stable societies in North America and Western Europe. In the process, Jewish communities in Muslim countries virtually disappeared. The movement of Jews out of Slavic areas was quantitatively heavier, but it did not reach the relative weight of the exodus from Africa and Asia (see Table 8).

⁴¹ N. D. Kondrat'ev, *The Long Wave Cycle* (New York, 1984); S. Kuznets, 'Long Swings in the Growth of Population and in Related Economic Variables', *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society* 102 (1958) n. 1, pp. 25-52; B. Thomas, *Migration and Urban Development: A Reappraisal of British and American Long Cycles* (London, 1972); T. K. Hopkins and I. Wallerstein, *The Age of Transition* (Binghamton, 1996).

Table 8. *Jewish International Migration, by Major Areas of Origin and Destination, 1881–1996*

Area of origin and destination ^a	1881– 1918	1919– 1948 ^b	1948 ^b – 1968	1969– 1996
Absolute numbers (thousands)				
Total	2,400	1,615	1,880	2,208
Yearly average	63	55	92	79
Per cent distribution				
Total	100	100	100	100
Total to Palestine/Israel	3	30	69	57
From Eastern Europe	2	21	27	<u>39</u>
From Africa-Asia	1	3	<u>37</u>	6
From Western countries	0	6	5	12
Total to Western countries	97	70	31	43
From Eastern Europe	<u>95</u>	<u>65</u>	6	23
From Africa-Asia	2 ^c	2	15	3
From Palestine/Israel	–	3 ^c	10 ^c	17 ^c
Total from Eastern Europe	97	86	33	62
Total from Africa-Asia	3	5	52	9
Yearly migrants per 1000 Jewish population in areas of origin				
Total	6	4	11	8
To Palestine/Israel				
From Eastern Europe	0	2	18	<u>59</u>
From Africa-Asia	1	2	<u>61</u>	56
From Western countries	0	1	1	1
To Western countries				
From Eastern Europe	<u>12</u>	<u>6</u>	4	18
From Africa-Asia	2 ^c	1	31	28
From Palestine/Israel	–	5 ^c	5 ^c	4 ^c
Total from Eastern Europe	12	8	22	81
Total from Africa-Asia	3	3	92	84

a. The largest migration stream in each column is underlined.

b. May 15.

c. All emigration from Palestine/Israel included here.

Source: Adapted from DellaPergola (1998), (see n. 40).

The United States, and to a lesser extent other Western countries, were the main recipients of Jewish migration until the early 1920s, while increasing legal limitations to Jewish immigration resulted in more diffuse patterns during the interwar period. Palestine then became for the first time one of the more significant targets for Jewish migration. After independence in 1948, Israel became the main beneficiary of world Jewish migration, absorbing about 69 per cent of the nearly 2 million Jewish international migrants of between 1948 and 1968, and 57 per cent of the 2.2 million who migrated between 1969 and 1996.

The stability over recent years of Jewish migration from Eastern Europe is striking. Some decline in the absolute frequency of immigration from the former Soviet Union to Israel since 1990 may have generated the impression that the massive flow is approaching an end. But considering the fact that the pool of potential immigrants is shrinking all the time—because of emigration and other demographic factors—the propensity to emigrate, after the initial two-year peak, has been stable and even increasing. The willingness of Eastern European Jews to leave the countries that hosted the cultural core of the Jewish Diaspora for many centuries continues to be high and consistent, as is their hope to find a better future elsewhere—whether in Israel, America or Germany.

Israel's role as a major country of Jewish immigration might constitute, *prima facie*, the exception to this pragmatic interpretation of Jewish migrations. In common wisdom, *aliyah* (the 'ascent' to Zion) tends to be explained primarily on ideological grounds. The two dominant factors in large-scale population transfer and resettlement are, as one might expect, Israel's centrality in the perception of Diaspora Jews and the logistical support of international organizations, led by the Jewish Agency. Detailed observation of the intensity of *aliyah* country by country, however, confirms the dependency of immigration on the varying incidence of negative, or push, factors in the countries of origin.⁴² Thus Israel's central role in Jewish migrations is not so inconsistent when viewed in the broader framework. Any apparent inconsistency is further reduced when we recognize that Israel has recently joined the group of twenty to twenty-five more

⁴² See also S. DellaPergola, 'Mass *Aliyah*—A Thing of the Past?' *Jerusalem Quarterly* 51 (1989) 96–114.

developed countries, and has thus become an attractive location independent of ideological motives, at least for migrants from less developed or less politically stable countries.

This is confirmed by an analysis of the frequency of migration to Israel from fifteen countries which host some of the largest Jewish communities, and which also reflect a wide cross-section of political regimes and economic standards of living (see Figure 5). After relating *aliyah* levels to the size of each Jewish community of origin, very significant variation appears in the respective yearly frequencies.⁴³ During the 1990s, migration to Israel from the Moldovan republic, the Caucasian area and from Central Asia was 1000 times more frequent, relative to the Jewish population at origin, than migration from the United States. The more detailed ranking of countries by frequency of *aliyah*, features the United States with the lowest rate; then Canada, the United Kingdom and France; next some less stable Western countries such as Argentina and South Africa; followed by the Russian republic, which is comparatively the more developed part of the FSU; and, finally, with the highest frequencies of *aliyah*, the poorest and least stable parts of the FSU—not to mention Ethiopia, one of the world's poorest countries, whose Jewish community has been completely transferred to Israel.

Jewish migration continues to be determined by ideological motivations, since all or most immigration to Israel might still find alternative countries of destination. But migration intensity is powerfully related to the quality of life, as expressed by the social, economic and political conditions in the countries of origin. Ideology is therefore necessary but not sufficient to generate large-scale *aliyah*, illustrating again the dependency of decisions taken within the Jewish collective on a broader array of societal determinants.

Regarding emigration from Israel, the much smaller number of emigrants compared to immigrants and the absence of major waves spanning several consecutive years appear to reflect that no major crisis has occurred in the country. The profile of Israeli emigration has rather been characterized by frequent short-term ups and downs, broadly comparable to those of the typical business cycle. Indeed, as is normal in developed countries, changing socio-economic and labour-market

⁴³ Here figured through logarithmic scale to render the graphical representation more efficient and readable.

indicators appear to account for the changing yearly numbers of emigrants from Israel.⁴⁴ Another main determinant was the variable pool of very recent immigrants, many of whom were not yet adjusted to and satisfied with their new environment. As may be expected in a country of large-scale immigration, each major incoming wave was followed by a smaller outward wave. In the long run, the absolute number of Israeli emigrants did increase, but in the context of the rapid growth of the Israeli population, annual emigration rates were rather low (between 3 and 5 per 1000 inhabitants), substantially stable or even somewhat declining over time. Measured per 1000 Jews in the countries of origin, the frequency of emigration from Israel is similar to the frequency of migration to Israel from various Western countries.

Looking at prospective world Jewish migration, the traditional reservoirs in North Africa, the Near East and Eastern Europe (mainly the FSU) have become, or in the longer term will become, virtually emptied, mostly because of large-scale emigration, but also because of the ageing and assimilation of those Jews who chose to remain (see below). Equally, the main receiving areas of Jewish migration (the Western countries and Israel where nowadays most of world Jewry live) are generally characterized by rather low emigration propensities. This would suggest the future relative stabilization of Jewish international migration, including *aliyah*, at low levels of mobility.

The problem with such an assumption is that it views the present world system as stable, which is contrary to long-term historical experience. It is reasonable to assume that changes in the world system, specifically regarding Israel's position within it and the development of peace and other political processes in the Middle East, will continue to affect the pace and direction of international migration in general and of Jewish migration in particular. But to predict what those global changes could be is far beyond the scope of this paper.⁴⁵

⁴⁴ Bachi, *The Population of Israel* (see n. 14); R. Lamdany, *Emigration from Israel* (Jerusalem, 1982).

⁴⁵ General global migration prospects are discussed in H. Zlotnik, 'Migration to and from Developing Countries: A Review of Past Trends', in W. Lutz (ed.) *The Future Population of the World: What Can We Assume Today?* (London, 1996) 299–335.

Socio-economic Mobility

Socio-economic trends among world Jewry are consonant with developments in the structure of the labour force in modern developed societies, but also continue to feature substantial distinctiveness.⁴⁶ One indicator, well rooted in the traditional emphasis of Jewish society on learning, is the uniquely high rates of higher education among Jews. The proportions of Jewish males and females holding university degrees remain far above the average of the total population even in the most advanced countries. There is nearly universal academization of the younger adult generation in the Diaspora and for a substantial minority professional training to the level of a master's degree or a PhD. Around 1990, about 70 per cent of Jewish adults held university degrees in both the US and the Russian Republic—a singular similarity given the huge difference in economic structure between the two societies. The percentages in other more developed countries were similar or only slightly lower.

In Israel, too, access to post-secondary and academic education is rapidly expanding, and with about 45 per cent of the younger adult generation now exposed to post-secondary studies, it compares favourably with general educational levels in most Western European societies. However, since the Israeli labour-force composition demands the employment of comparatively high proportions of Jews in industry, services and, in smaller numbers, agriculture, a lower proportion of professionals and other university trainees can be employed than in occupationally selective Jewish minorities in the Diaspora.

In the more developed economies, such as the US, the overwhelming concentration of Jews has gradually moved since the beginning of the century from industrial production to trade and sales, management and finally to the liberal and academic professions. The socio-economic

⁴⁶ See the still-classic analysis of S. Kuznets, 'Economic Structure and Life of the Jews', in L. Finkelstein (ed.) *The Jews: Their History, Culture and Religion* (New York, 1960) 1597–1666. More recent data are analysed by B. R. Chiswick, 'The Postwar Economy of American Jews', in P. Y. Medding (ed.) *Studies in Contemporary Jewry* 8 (1992) 85–101; C. Goldscheider, 'Stratification and the Transformation of American Jews 1910–90: Have the Changes Resulted in Assimilation?', in S. DellaPergola and J. Even (eds) *Papers in Jewish Demography 1993 in Memory of U. O. Schmelz* (Jerusalem, 1997) 259–75; M. Tolts, 'The Interrelationship between Emigration and the Sociodemographic Profile of Russian Jewry', in N. Lewin-Epstein, Y. Ro'i and P. Ritterband (eds) *Russian Jews on Three Continents* (London, 1997) 147–76.

profile of the Jewish population tended to converge towards the higher rungs of the national occupational ladder.⁴⁷ In the US around 1990, 39 per cent of employed Jewish males and 36 per cent of females were in the academic, technical and liberal professions, over twice the proportion among total whites.⁴⁸ Elsewhere the trend was slower and the concentration of Jews in trade and industry remained significant. A further important change across the board consisted in the passage of Jews from self-employment to salaried positions, although among the Jewish labour force in most Diaspora communities, self-employment continues to be distinctive and largely above average for the total population. Yet a growing share of Jews now work as employees for large-scale national or multinational organizations, and their presence has also increased in the public sector where it was traditionally scant. One diffused result of these trends is higher income levels among the Jewish labour force in comparison with the average in their respective countries. One gains the impression, though, that such income gaps were more impressive during the 1970s than they are at the end of the 1990s.

Two socio-economic issues seem in recent years to be of special interest for the Jewish public. The first concerns the possible effects of economic globalization and of the periodic waves in national economies on the standard of living of the Jewish community. Especially affected seem to be many medium and small Jewish entrepreneurs who did well in the recent past, but whose bases of economic activity are now powerfully challenged by competition from the emerging economies in less developed countries. The second concern refers to what happens at the end of social mobility. It now seems that for many Jewish households the main objective is no longer to improve their social status, but rather to maintain what has already been achieved. This requires quite different strategies from those called for in the past, and the outcome is not obvious considering that upward social mobility also exists among the non-Jewish majority. These issues indicate a certain degree of economic uncertainty for an otherwise mostly middle-class and fairly comfortable Jewish population. But the far greater degree of socio-economic homogeneity

⁴⁷ B. A. Kosmin and S. P. Lachman, *One Nation Under God: Religion in Contemporary American Society* (New York, 1993).

⁴⁸ Goldstein, 'Profile of American Jewry' (sec n. 31).

among Diaspora Jews than among the general population of their respective countries, or even among Jews in Israel, remains a well-established fact both in the recent past and for the foreseeable future. This implies that socio-demographic changes tend to be more synchronic and massive among the Jewish Diaspora than in other environments, whenever relevant political, economic and cultural conditions emerge.

One significant pattern that emerges, already hinted at in our discussion of Jewish urbanization and metropolitanization, is the very high degree of geographical mobility within and between urban areas. The main determinant is the availability of career opportunities, which in turn reflects the general trends of national and regional development in each country. This contrasts with the past, when Jewish geography was determined largely by historical patterns of settlement tied to the political-economic constraints of the pre-emancipation period. One consequence of interest is the continuous movement of Jews from locales with a stronger Jewish infrastructure to places with a weaker one, which tends significantly to dilute the individual expression of Jewish identification, and to weaken affiliation with Jewish organizations.⁴⁹

In spite of these processes, Jewish population distribution within the main urban areas continues to be characterized by highly distinctive patterns. Residential distributions primarily reflect socio-economic stratification; and just as Jewish occupational mobility has resulted in a massive redistribution throughout occupational groups, social classes and income strata, so Jewish residential mobility has led to relocation throughout the appropriate sections of the urban fabric. In most large urban areas a very substantial minority, and sometimes the majority, of the Jewish population can be found in a minority of city divisions. The predominant trend in most large conurbations is one of growing territorial diffusion and population deconcentration, and Jews, who sometimes anticipated and sometimes followed this general trend, periodically become more or less concentrated with respect to the total urban population.⁵⁰ While overall Jewish ecological concentration has

⁴⁹ S. and A. Goldstein, *Jews on the Move* (Albany, 1997); U. Rebhun, 'Changing Patterns of Internal Migration 1970-1990: A Comparative Analysis of Jews and Whites in the United States', *Demography* 34:2 (1997) 213-23.

⁵⁰ R. Bachi, S. DellaPergola and V. Klaff, *Urban Ecology of the Jews in the Diaspora*, Report Submitted to the US-Israel Binational Science Foundation (Jerusalem, 1988).

been declining over time, it still constitutes one of the salient bases for frequent personal interaction and community organization.

Changing Family Patterns

While the family has long functioned as the cornerstone of Jewish society, the past few decades have witnessed an unprecedented erosion of the conventional roles of marriage and procreation in the family. Jews historically anticipated many other social, religious and ethnic groups in completing the transition from high to low and controlled fertility.⁵¹ In more recent years, Diaspora Jews often followed the changing family patterns of Western societies, resulting in delayed marriages, higher rates of permanent non-marriage, more frequent cohabitation, growing rates of divorce, low birthrates, growing proportions of births out of marriage (the latter still uncommon among Jews), increasing numbers of one-parent households and, most significantly, increasingly high rates of intermarriage. Children of the latter have shown comparatively low rates of Jewish identification, while the propensity of the non-Jewish spouses to convert to Judaism has been declining relative to the total number of out-marriages.⁵²

Jewish continuity in the past was anchored in the conventional nuclear family: universal marriage, endogamy and a fertility level which, while not perhaps the highest in comparison to other populations, was fairly stable and sufficient for generation replacement. Obviously, socialization of the children of Jewish families occurred within the context of a Jewish community which projected a clear Jewish cultural message, or at least a clearly defined and prescriptive system of Jewish behaviour and interaction.

Among more recent generations, and especially since the 1970s, Jewish family patterns have been changing quickly in consonance with changes in the general social context.⁵³ In Western societies, where most of world Jewry lives, the traditional concept of the nuclear family has been weakening, and it has become one of several competing

⁵¹ See P. Ritterband (ed.) *Modern Jewish Fertility* (Leyden, 1981).

⁵² See an overview in S. DellaPergola, 'Recent Trends in Jewish Marriage', in S. DellaPergola and L. Cohen (eds) *World Jewish Population: Trends and Policies* (Jerusalem, 1992) 65-92.

⁵³ D. Coleman, 'European Demographic Systems of the Future: Convergence or Diversity?', in *Eurostat, Human Resources in Europe at the Dawn of the 21st Century* (Luxembourg, 1992) 137-79.

alternative family and household arrangements.⁵⁴ If current behaviours continue, about 40-50 per cent of the young-adult generation in most Western countries will never marry, which would constitute a substantial departure from the past, even in Western Catholic societies which have traditionally featured moderately high rates of permanent celibacy.⁵⁵ Moreover, about 35-45 per cent of those who marry will divorce (more than 50 per cent in the US), and about one-fourth to one-third of all the births in most Western countries will occur out of marriage. In England and Wales, as well as in France, the latter proportion approaches one-third, while in Sweden and Denmark it is currently closer to 50 per cent of all births, marking an increase in the number and share of one-parent households. Furthermore, the Total Fertility Rate (TFR), which measures the level of reproduction based on current performance, is lower than necessary for the current generation of child-bearing age to replace itself.⁵⁶ The most intriguing cases internationally are those of Italy followed by Spain. These Catholic and once rather traditional societies now have the lowest fertility levels in the world, slightly above one child, whereas a little more than two would be required to replace the existing generation.

In this context of sweeping change in family models, it is not surprising to find Jewish populations moving in the same direction, although in some respects change has been more conservative and slower. The tendency among Jews to divorce has increased more slowly than among the general population, but the gap is tending to disappear. On the other hand, the trend towards births out of marriage has not become fashionable in the Jewish environment—thus excluding a potential raising factor in an already very low level of Jewish fertility.

Significant gaps emerged between family patterns in the Diaspora (with relatively minor regional and local variations) and in Israel. Among Israel's Jewish population marriage has continued to be nearly universal (less than 5 per cent never-married Jews around the age of

⁵⁴ F. K. Goldscheider and L. J. Waite, *New Families, No Families? The Transformation of the American Home* (Berkeley, Los Angeles and Oxford, 1991).

⁵⁵ R. B. Dixon, 'Explaining Cross-Cultural Variation in Age at Marriage and Proportions Never Marrying', *Population Studies* 25:2 (1971) 215-33.

⁵⁶ The TFR is a measure of the projected number of children expected assuming unlimited continuation of the age-specific fertility levels observed at a given date. The TFR provides an average estimate for all women, regardless of marital status.

50), although the trend to postpone marriage has clearly appeared. Divorce remains at moderate levels (15-20 per cent of marriages). Children born to single mothers continued to constitute about 1 per cent of the Jewish birth rate in Israel.⁵⁷

Mixed marriage

Perhaps the major demographic divide between Jews in Israel and in the Diaspora concerns the choice of spouse and the frequency of marriage with non-Jewish partners. Mixed marriage virtually does not exist in Israel because of the predominantly Jewish context of Israeli society compared to the Jewish minority status in the Diaspora. However, increasing numbers of out-married families have migrated to Israel in recent years, especially from the former Soviet Union. The increasing frequency of out-marriage requires careful examination. The question is not only the choice of partner, but whether the group identification of the children will be with the Jewish or with the non-Jewish side, thus affecting the long-term chain of generational continuity.


A mixed marriage is defined here as one in which a Jew marries a non-Jew who keeps his or her previous religious identification. If the non-Jewish spouse converts to Judaism the marriage cannot be considered technically as mixed and is defined as a conversionary marriage. The definition of out-marriage applies to both situations.

Here, in a somewhat provocative mode, I will juxtapose two different sets of data, one relating to the US and the other to Israel (see Figure 6).⁵⁸ The data reflect two very different situations, so it may appear to misrepresent the facts to examine them side by side. Nevertheless, the comparison may help to illustrate one major point of interpretation.

The debate about mixed marriage and its demographic consequences was greatly stimulated by the 1990 National Jewish Population Survey (NJPS) estimate of a 52 per cent rate of mixed marriage among Jews who married between 1985 and 1990, after

⁵⁷ S. DellaPergola, 'Demographic Changes in Israel in the Early 1990s', in Y. Kop (ed.) *Israel Social Services, 1992-93* (Jerusalem, 1993) 57-115.

⁵⁸ The data for both US and Israel are based on the Benini index, a measure of the tendency to marry in or out of one's own group, refined for the size of the respective groups.

Figure 6. *Jewish Out-marriage, United States and Israel*

discounting for conversionary marriages.⁵⁹ Because it is a very large Jewish community, and supposedly the one which enjoys the highest degree of cultural autonomy and the ability to deploy a cohesive and self-contained Jewish life, the level of heterogamy was expected to remain comparatively lower in the US than in other Diaspora communities. NJPS pointed to a very quick increase in Jewish out-marriage during the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s. When the data are separately

⁵⁹ B. A. Kosmin, S. Goldstein, J. Waksberg, N. Lerer, A. Keysar and J. Scheckner, *Highlights of the CJF 1990 National Jewish Population Survey* (see n. 18). After independently processing the NJPS file, this author obtained 46 per cent of mixed marriages among Jewish-born individuals who were married over the ten-year period 1981-90. Given the increasing frequency of mixed marriage over time, our figure is consistent with the estimate in the original NJPS report which refers to the five-year period before 1990. A 46 per cent individual rate of mixed marriage corresponds to 61 per cent of the new married couples. See: S. DellaPergola, 'New Data on Demography and Identification among U.S. Jews: Trends, Inconsistencies, Disagreements', *Contemporary Jewry* 12 (1991) 67-97.

analysed for the more recent marriage cohorts, and scrutinized according to the number of generations spent in the United States, the current level of mixed marriage is closer to 70 per cent among members of the fourth generation—that is, people born in the US whose grandparents were already in the country.⁶⁰ This points to a continuing and still not exhausted assimilation drift, whose final outcome may be the confluence of many Jews into a merged white-European ethnic group,⁶¹ of a kind that is becoming one of the main building blocks in America and in other multicultural societies, along with people of Black, Asian or Hispanic origin.

On the basis of these findings, the objection was raised by some analysts that the NJPS Jewish sample erroneously included several cases that should instead have been classified as non-Jews,⁶² which in turn would artificially raise the computed percentages of out-marriage. This reasoning, while technically plausible, hides a serious problem. If the supposedly non-Jewish fringes are excluded from the analysis, the NJPS sample would indeed produce lower rates of out-marriage, but it would also show a US core Jewish population estimate lowered by 500,000, and closer to 5 than to 5.5 million Jews in 1990.⁶³ One is left with the choice between a smaller and less out-married Jewish population, and a larger and more assimilated one.

Beyond these debates, there is little doubt that in the US, as in most other large Diaspora communities, mixed marriage has reached historical highs after growing significantly since the 1960s. Mixed-marriage frequencies were much higher in most of Eastern Europe, specifically in the large community of the Russian Republic and most recently in Ukraine.⁶⁴ In Britain the trend was slower, but more recent data show that the increased frequency of mixed marriage is not very different from that in the United States. About 44 per cent of young Jewish

⁶⁰ B. A. Phillips, *Re-examining Inter-marriage: Trends, Textures, Strategies* (New York, 1997).

⁶¹ S. Lieberson and M. C. Waters, *From Many Strands: Ethnic and Racial Groups in Contemporary America* (New York, 1988); R. Waldinger and M. Bozorgmehr (eds) *Ethnic Los Angeles* (New York, 1996).

⁶² S. M. Cohen and G. Berger, 'Understanding and Misunderstanding the 1990 National Jewish Population Survey', Paper presented at consultation on the 1990 National Jewish Population Survey, Waltham, 1991.

⁶³ DellaPergola, 'New Data' (see n. 59).

⁶⁴ Tolts, 'Demographic Trends' (see n. 35).

male adults who married at the beginning of the 1990s chose a non-Jewish partner.⁶⁵ Similar frequencies were estimated for communities in several other West European and Latin American communities as well as in Ukraine until the late 1980s, while they were somewhat lower in Canada and Australia and notably lower in Mexico. Clearly, though, there appears to be quite a pervasive challenge to endogamic family formation across the Diaspora.

Research in the US and in Britain indicated that the most important factor associated with the frequency of mixed marriage was the cultural environment provided in the parental home during childhood. The level of Jewishness of the parental home exerted stronger effects on adult identification than the type and amount of formal Jewish education received,⁶⁶ although this has a measurable strengthening effect on Jewish identification.⁶⁷ Some circular correlation was found between divorce, remarriage and mixed marriage.⁶⁸ Out-marriages tend to terminate in divorce more often than in-marriages, while remarriages after divorce following in-marriage often tend to be out-marriages. The relation of out-marriage frequencies to age and generation is also significant, implying the increasing effect of general cultural and social change over Jewish identification as the Jewish presence develops deeper roots in its present environment. The relationship between socio-economic status and mixed marriage may also be negative: recent data point to higher levels of out-marriage among Jews with less formal education and lower occupational status.⁶⁹ This reflects the greater difficulty that may be experienced by lower-income households in keeping in touch with the organized Jewish community and its social and educational facilities.

⁶⁵ Miller *et al.*, *Social and Political Attitudes* (see n. 27).

⁶⁶ U. Rebbun and S. DellaPergola, 'Socio-demographic and Identity Aspects of Inter-marriage among the Jews of the United States', in I. Bartal and I. Gafni (eds) *Sexuality and the Family in History* (Tel Aviv, 1998) 369-98 (in Hebrew); P. Y. Medding, G. A. Tobin, S. Barack Fishman and M. Rimor, 'Jewish Identity in Conversionary and Mixed Marriages', *American Jewish Year Book* 92 (1992) 3-76.

⁶⁷ S. Barack Fishman and A. Goldstein, *When They Are Grown They Will Not Depart: Jewish Education and the Jewish Behavior of American Adults* (Waltham, 1993); E. Katz and M. Rimor, *Jewish Involvement of the Baby Boom Generation; Interrogating the 1990 National Jewish Population Survey* (Jerusalem, 1993).

⁶⁸ B. A. Kosmin, N. Lerer and E. Mayer, *Inter-marriage, Divorce and Remarriage among American Jews, 1982-87* (New York, 1989).

⁶⁹ DellaPergola, 'New Data' (see n. 59).

The consequences of mixed marriage for Jewish demography are related to the choice of identification for the children of such marriages. A variety of sources consistently show that the majority of children of such couples were identified with the non-Jewish parent or were given dual or no religious identification by the parents. The distribution of children of mixed marriages according to the 1990 NJPS was 28 per cent Jewish, 41 per cent non-Jewish and 31 per cent dual or non committal. Typically, children whose identification was postponed tend to socialize with the majority rather than the minority. Research also reveals that the religious identification of the children of mixed marriage more often tends to be affected by the mother, at least in English-speaking countries. Some evidence of a prevailing paternal influence on identification in Latin societies should be corroborated by more recent data.⁷⁰

Overall, the emerging picture from recent research is one of demographic and cultural factors powerfully eroding the chances for Jewish generational replacement. At the same time, the ambiguous identity of many of the offspring of out-marriage should be acknowledged. Their identification may not be definitively determined in childhood or adult life, but may change in response to new and unpredictable circumstances, as can be seen from the revival of Jewish identification among many highly assimilated Jews in the FSU since the 1990s. To some extent, then, evaluation of the consequences of mixed marriage is a matter for permanent reassessment.

It is surely relevant, if unconventional, to juxtapose these Diaspora marriage trends with mention of the tendency in Israel for Jews from different ethno-cultural backgrounds to marry. While popular reference to Sephardim and Ashkenazim is customary, from an analytic point of view it is sounder to distinguish, respectively, between Jews from Asian and African countries and from European and American countries. Figure 6 indicates a nearly uninterrupted and clear tendency towards intermarriage among Israel's Jewish population, providing important evidence of growing ethno-cultural convergence in Israel.⁷¹

⁷⁰ S. DellaPergola, 'Marriage, Conversion, Children and Jewish Continuity: Some Demographic Aspects of "Who is a Jew?"', in W. Frankel and A. Lerman (eds) *Survey of Jewish Affairs 1989* (Oxford, 1989) 171-87.

⁷¹ U. O. Schmelz, S. DellaPergola and U. Avner, *Ethnic Differences Among Israeli Jews: A New Look* (Jerusalem, 1991).

By the 1990s, the proportion marrying a person from a different origin group was more than half what could be expected if spouse selection were the product of a purely random choice.

These very similar trends in the US and Israel point to the effects of natural intermingling of social and cultural groups in societies which encourage group interaction and do not interpose political, legal, economic, social or cultural barriers. Frequent nonconflictual interaction,⁷² made easy by common bases of economic activity, social life, residential neighbourhoods and friendships, may lead to marriage. It is obviously not the same whether Jewish heterogamy occurs within the Jewish fold (as in Israel) or outside it (as in the Diaspora), but basically the same social and demographic process is at work. It should also be realized that under the present circumstances more of the same trend can be expected. While it cannot reasonably be expected that out-marriage rates will reach the maximum possible level of 100 per cent, there is still room for further increases before the levels eventually stabilize.

Fertility


Another fundamental divide between Jews in Israel and the Diaspora concerns fertility levels, or the number of children born. A synopsis of selected data portrays Jewish fertility over the last sixty years, its upward and downward fluctuations over time, and its patterns of convergence and divergence across geographical, social and cultural settings (see Figure 7).

Let us first look at the experience in Israel.⁷³ Israeli Jewish fertility levels have been unusually high and steady when compared with those in most other developed countries. Fertility in 1996, measured through the TFR, was 2.6 children, enough to support population growth. Women originating from Asia and Africa, with an average fertility rate of about 6 children during the 1950s, in Israel underwent a process of modernization, and fertility declined to a level of between 3 and 4 children among women born during the 1940s, who have now reached the end of their reproductive period. On the other hand, the fertility level of Jewish women of European origin, which had significantly

⁷² The wording is taken from Goldscheider and Zuckerman, *The Transformation of the Jews* (see n. 4) 9.

⁷³ See E. Peritz and M. Baras (eds) *Studies in the Fertility of Israel* (Jerusalem, 1992).

Figure 7. *Total Children Born to Jewish Women in Selected Countries, by Year of Birth of Mothers*



declined during the interwar period, tended to rise in Israel in line with the ideal model of the 'fusion of the Diasporas'. In the new Israeli context, then, fertility tended to converge. This is confirmed by the family size preferences of Jewish women born in Israel—themselves to some extent the product of the intermarriages of immigrants from

different continents—whose reproduction behaviour is consistently intermediate between those of the immigrants of various origins.

The current fertility level of Jewish women in Israel, while significantly lower than that of Israeli Muslims, remains unique among the more developed countries. There is no other developed country with an above-parity current level of generational replacement. Until the 1980s Catholic Ireland provided a societal context not much influenced by changes in family style and size, but during the past fifteen years Ireland has joined other Western countries in the trend to below-replacement fertility and its current fertility rate is less than two children.

Jewish fertility outside Israel provides some insights into the Jewish experience whose interest extends beyond the specific theme of reproduction. The leading example is provided by the United States, where it declined sharply, like general fertility, in connection with the economic depression of the late 1920s and the 1930s. Economic recovery during the Second World War and the postwar period of prosperity, optimism and economic expansion brought about the so-called baby-boom, reaching a peak during the late 1950s. That significant increase in family size was experienced by Jewish women who were born during the 1920s and 1930s, but it did not last long. The transformations in American society since the late 1960s, epitomized by the increased emphasis on individual achievement and new and more complex roles for women, were associated with a renewed decline of fertility. Jewish fertility not only followed suit, but anticipated that trend:⁷⁴ it was systematically lower than the national average of US whites and tended to respond more quickly to periodic changes, as is appropriate to a better-educated population more in control of reproductive processes. In 1990, Jewish women aged about 50, who had completed their child-bearing, had an average of 1.5-1.6 children. Significantly, Jewish attitudes toward reproduction continued to be fairly traditional and child-oriented. However, following up on young adults during the 1970s and 1980s shows that actual reproductive behaviour simply did not follow declared intentions.⁷⁵ Larger families

⁷⁴ S. DellaPergola, 'Patterns of American Jewish Fertility', *Demography* 17:3 (1980) 261-73.

⁷⁵ F. L. Mott and J. C. Abma, 'Contemporary Jewish Fertility: Does Religion Make A Difference?', *Contemporary Jewry* 13 (1992) 74-94.

among the Orthodox community had only a minor impact on the overall fertility of American Jewry. All in all, the parallel unfolding of US national and Jewish fertility trends reveals once again the dependency of Jewish demography on the fluctuations of the economic, social and cultural context of society at large.

In the Russian Republic, the main component of the FSU, Jewish mothers born at the beginning of the century were already having an average of about 1.5 children or fewer.⁷⁶ But what is completely missing is any sign of a postwar demographic recovery. Jewish fertility levels look as if a situation of permanent, unrelieved economic depression (by US terms of reference) had prevailed in the USSR over the last sixty or seventy years. Prolonged low fertility produced, as will be shown below, a very striking process of ageing within the Jewish population.

No matter how distant from one another and antagonistic the US and USSR social systems may have been, Jewish fertility in the two countries tended to converge. Even if on a variety of indicators a wide gulf separated the two countries, Jewish demographic behaviour ended up following very similar paths.

Several other Jewish communities can be cited where for the past twenty years Jewish fertility levels stood far below the minimum for generational replacement, including those in Canada, Argentina, Australia and even France, despite its significant intake of immigrants of North African parentage. In all these countries, after allowing for children of Jewish parentage who are not raised as Jews, the low levels of effectively Jewish fertility imply a net reduction in the size of generations, a narrowing of the younger bases of the age structure and a progressive transformation in age composition commonly defined as demographic ageing. The unavoidable consequence, in the longer term, is a sharp decline in Jewish population.

One interesting exception to date has been the Jewish community of Mexico which, by the early 1990s, continued to display a moderate margin of demographic growth. An explanation could be provided by a combination of factors: the still comparatively segregated position of the Jewish community and its low rates of intermarriage, the mix of

⁷⁶ L. Darsky and S. Scherbov, 'Parity Progression Fertility Tables for the Nationalities of the USSR', IIASA Working Paper (Laxenburg, 1990); Tolts, 'Demographic Trends' (see n. 35).

Sephardi and Ashkenazi Jewish sub-ethnic communities, and the overall favourable economic situation of a majority of the community, allowing more time for family roles on the part of Jewish women and easy availability of household help. We can only guess whether the uniqueness of the Mexican Jewish experience is merely the expression of socio-economic advantages that might fade away, as has already occurred to the Jewish community of South Africa,⁷⁷ or whether it rests on deeper and longer-lasting socio-cultural premises.

Even at the height of the baby-boom, the level of completed Jewish fertility in the US reached around or just above 2.5 children—a level just below the minimum experienced in Israel during its fifty years of existence. Indeed, after allowing for the modernization among the more traditional groups of immigrants, and keeping in mind the high labour-force participation of Jewish women in Israel, the Israeli fertility experience can be described as a fifty-year-long baby-boom. Even in the absence of proof that the same people would have borne a different number of children had they lived elsewhere, evidence that such is the case is more than anecdotal, as many Jewish families or even entire communities split by international migration have ended up with very different demographic behaviours.⁷⁸ Compositional differences such as the higher proportion of religious families in Israel⁷⁹ or the comparatively higher educational level in the Diaspora do not provide a sufficiently persuasive explanation of Israel-Diaspora fertility differentials. It remains to be explained why similar people living in different environments should behave so differently on such an important aspect of life as reproduction.

In the present context of widespread and efficient family-size

⁷⁷ S. DellaPergola and A. A. Dubb, 'South African Jewry: A Sociodemographic Profile', *American Jewish Year Book* 88 (1988) 59–140.

⁷⁸ Bensimon and DellaPergola, *La population juive de France* (see n. 23).

⁷⁹ U. O. Schmelz, 'Religiosity and Fertility among the Jews of Jerusalem', in U. O. Schmelz and S. DellaPergola (eds) *Papers in Jewish Demography, 1985* (Jerusalem, 1989) 157–85; D. Friedlander and C. Feldman, 'The Modern Shift to Below-Replacement Fertility: Has Israel's Population Joined the Process?', *Population Studies* 47 (1993) 295–306; J. Anson and A. Meir, 'Religiosity, Nationalism and Fertility in Israel', *European Journal of Population* 12 (1996) 1–25; I. Adler and E. Peritz, 'Religious Observance and Desired Fertility among Jewish Women in Israel', in S. DellaPergola and J. Even (eds) *Papers in Jewish Demography 1993 in Memory of U.O. Schmelz* (Jerusalem, 1997) 377–87.

control the fundamental determinants of family size can be summarized as the interplay of the cultural value of children, the cost of child-raising and the economic resources available to the household.⁸⁰ Differentials in the desire for children in different Jewish communities appear to operate, too, through a complex combination of cultural and socio-economic channels. On average, Jews in the Diaspora have at their disposal more personal economic resources than Jews in Israel, which, *per se*, would be conducive to larger families. The feeling of insecurity possibly associated with minority status was suggested as a further significant determinant of lower fertility among minorities in general and Diaspora Jews in particular.⁸¹ If so, a growing feeling of adaptation to the general environment, as experienced by contemporary Jewish communities, should lead to an end of the minority-status syndrome.⁸² But that assumption is not supported by recent data. Instead, evidence is accumulating that the different meaning of, and commitment to, Jewish continuity and to community bonds in a broader sense stands at the core of an explanation of the larger Jewish family size in Israel as compared to the rest of world Jewry.⁸³ An additional factor is that the State of Israel has put in place a system of child-care facilities and woman-oriented social-security benefits which make child-rearing there more feasible than in most other developed countries.

Beyond interpretations, however, this analysis shows that fertility in Israel is at an average of 2.6 Jewish children per woman (regardless of marital status), while in other Jewish communities worldwide (with few exceptions) it stands at around 1.5 or less. This corresponds to a ratio of nearly 2:1 children born, which will obviously affect much of what is going to happen demographically to the Jews in the twenty-first century.

⁸⁰ An early specification of this hypothesis appears in J. J. Spengler, 'Values and Fertility Analysis', *Demography* 3:1, pp. 109–30.

⁸¹ C. Goldscheider and P. R. Uhlenberg, 'Minority Status and Fertility', *American Journal of Sociology* 76 (1969) 361–72.

⁸² C. Goldscheider, *Jewish Continuity and Change: Emerging Patterns in America* (Bloomington, 1986).

⁸³ I. Ziegler, *Family Growth in Israel and 'the Critical Child'* (Jerusalem, PhD dissertation [Hebrew], 1995).

Consequences for Jewish Population Structure: Quality and Quantity

It should be clear from this discussion that the Jewish demographic equation is the complex product of intertwined factors. On the one hand, Jewish identity tends to be increasingly affected by the character and variation of socio-demographic trends. On the other hand, different patterns of Jewish identification may play an important role in determining the future unfolding of demographic trends.

Major Brands of Jewish Identification

Partly as the consequence, but partly as the cause, of the mobility and family trends just described—including the modes of socialization of the children of out-marriage—the spectrum of existing patterns of Jewish identification in Israel and the Diaspora is widening. Much of the current debate about Jewish identification deals with the ideological differences that exist between different denominations. While ideational gaps between Orthodox, Conservative, Reform or Liberal Jews are significant and sometimes entail serious conflicts, the substance of Jewish identification is better described in broader and less politically laden terms.⁸⁴

Viewed with extreme simplification, and ignoring for a moment the specific cultural traits in each local community, contemporary Jewish identification consists of four major types.⁸⁵ These types can be determined through the combination of only two variables: the nature of individual beliefs and behaviour, and the nature of community connections. An attempt can be made to associate some very rough quantitative estimates with the respective definitions (see Table 9).

(a) A 'normative/traditional' type includes those people who nearly exclusively adhere to a self-contained complex of Jewish beliefs, norms

⁸⁴ For an interesting methodological and substantive survey, see S. Levy, H. Levinsohn and E. Katz, *Beliefs, Observances and Social Interactions among Israeli Jews* (Jerusalem 1993). See also S. M. Cohen, *Contents or Continuity? Alternative Bases for Commitment* (New York, 1991); J. Webber, 'Modern Jewish Identities', in J. Webber (ed.) *Jewish Identities in New Europe* (London and Washington, 1994) 74–86.

⁸⁵ S. DellaPergola, 'Arthur Ruppin Revisited: The Jews of Today, 1904–1994', in S. M. Cohen and G. Horenczyk (eds) *National Variations in Modern Jewish Identity* (Albany, 1998).

Table 9. *Summary of Main Modes of Jewish Identification: Israel and Diaspora Jewry, Rough Estimates, Early 1990s*

Type of identification	World (thousands)	Diaspora (thousands)	Israel (thousands)	% in Israel
Total	13,000	8,600	4,400	33.8
Normative/Traditional	2,000	1,000	1,000	50.0
Ethnicity/Community	6,000	3,200	2,800	53.3
Cultural residue	4,000	3,500	500	12.5
Dual Jewish/Non-Jewish	1,000	900	100	10.0

Source: Adapted from DellaPergola (1998), (see n, 85).

and values and who consistently perform Jewish traditional ritual practices. These mostly religious people are cohesively integrated into an exclusive Jewish community of reference and Jewish social networks which emphasize religious leadership and enforce negative sanctions in case of deviance from the norm. The normative/traditional type as defined here, in spite of being torn by deep internal political rivalries, and even disagreements on fundamental issues of a religious nature, is sufficiently different from the others to retain meaning as an overall category. Their total number can be estimated at 2 million worldwide, half of which lives in Israel.

(b) A 'ethnic-communal' type typically includes those who maintain a cohesive community of reference through strictly or predominantly Jewish association networks, whereas in-group communication includes a great amount of non-specifically Jewish cultural content. A case in point is affiliation with Jewish recreational organizations where participants tend to be exclusively or mostly Jewish. It seems justifiable to include here many Jews whose main attachment to Judaism is through membership in a religious congregation where, as in the case of some contemporary non-Orthodox religious congregations, the sense of community is preserved, while the unique element of Jewish traditional or, in broader terms, cultural exclusiveness is not. The total Jewish population thus defined approaches 6 million, about half of whom live in the Diaspora—prominently in Latin America, Britain and other countries of the former Commonwealth, and among large sections of US Jewry. The other half adhering to this mode of identification lives

in Israel where indeed a blend of national Israeliness with some traditionalism represents the predominant mode of Jewish identification.

(c) A 'cultural residue type' includes those for whom some attachment to Judaism may persist independently of clearly recognizable personal Jewish behaviour or associative involvement in a Jewish community. Memory, curiosity, knowledge of a Jewish language, some notion of one's own Jewish historical past, tradition, culture, interest in Jewish scholarship or even a sense of ancestral nostalgia may be factors in such a form of sporadic, but nonetheless sincere, belonging. Thus defined, culture provides a more ambiguous, less binding criterion for Jewish identification, typical of those unaffiliated to the web of Jewish organizations, and does not create an exclusively Jewish bond in the face of the rest of the world. About 4 million Jews globally seem to fit this definition, most of them in the Diaspora, typically in Eastern Europe, but also in large numbers in the United States, France and other West European countries.

(d) A 'zero Jewish' or 'dual Jewish/non-Jewish' type of identification was clearly documented in America through the 1990 NJPS, having its counterpart among those non-Jews who for a variety of reasons keep some links with Jews and Judaism. It applies to people of Jewish origin whose cultural outlook and frame of reference are basically non-Jewish, but who nevertheless belong within the definitional framework adopted to quantify the Jewish population. In practice, a declining intensity of Jewish identification tends to be replaced by an increasing identification with other religious, ethnic, communal or cultural contents—until the last remnants of Jewish identification become so marginal that they simply fade away. Possibly 1 million Jews correspond to such a definition, mostly outside Israel, typically including the most assimilated fringes of the Jewish population in Eastern Europe and the Western countries.

With these categories in mind, it should be clear that Jewish society cannot be divided into a few discrete categories, but consists of a highly dynamic and fluid continuum. Boundaries between the various identifications, and the degree of intensity within each, are obviously flexible and mutable.⁸⁶ Historically, mobility of the Jewish public

⁸⁶ See also S. DellaPergola, G. Sabagh, M. Bozorgmehr, C. Der-Martirosian and S. Lerner, 'Hierarchic Levels of Subethnicity: Near Eastern Jews in the U.S., France and Mexico', in E. Krausz and G. Tulea (eds) *Sociological Papers* 5:2 (1996) 1–42.

across identificational sectors determined, on balance, a net flow away from the more religious towards the less religious. Under present conditions, passage from one to any other type may be easy and frequent, occur all the time and may be repeatedly experienced by the same individual, perhaps under the impact of specific circumstances at any given moment.⁸⁷ Yet a schematic representation of a cross-section of different modes of identification among present-day Jews may provide a baseline for assessing expected developments among a later generation. Different models of family formation and family size, and different capacities to transmit Jewish identity to a younger generation, are associated with each major identificational type. Belonging to each type consequently implies a different probability of remaining Jewish, both for the population directly involved (as an aggregate, not necessarily for each individual), and for their descendants in the next or subsequent generations.

Age Composition

Age composition of the population mediates between demographic trends of the past and the future, reflecting the combination of past events in the areas of fertility, mortality and international migration. As the occurrence of such events is strongly correlated with age, age composition also powerfully determines the likelihood of their reoccurrence.

A comparison of age composition among Jewish populations over the twentieth century provides a synthetic portrayal of the transition from the traditional demographic patterns of the past to the ageing trends of the present (see Table 10).⁸⁸ Jewish communities in Eastern Europe at the beginning of the century, and in Asia and Africa at much later dates, displayed very high proportions of children, reflecting high fertility, and relatively small proportions of the elderly. The process of demographic modernization and change, starting in

⁸⁷ For general studies of identificational changes in contemporary America, see M. Gordon, *Assimilation in American Life: The Role of Race, Religion and National Origins* (New York, 1964); M. C. Waters, *Ethnic Options: Choosing Identities in America* (Berkeley, 1990); W. C. Roof, *A Generation of Seekers: The Spiritual Journeys of the Baby Boom Generation* (New York, 1993).

⁸⁸ U. O. Schmelz, *Aging of World Jewry* (Jerusalem, 1984); S. DellaPergola, 'Histoire démographique du peuple juif: bref aperçu', in S. Trigano (ed.) *La société juive à travers l'histoire* (Paris, 1993-4) 574-619, 727-32.

Table 10. *Distribution of Jewish Population by Age-group in Selected Countries, for Selected Years (%)*

Country ^a	Year	Total	0-14	15-29	30-44	45-64	65+
Traditional type							
Ethiopia	1991	100	<u>51</u>	20	13	11	5
Syria	1960	100	<u>43</u>	23	12	16	6
Russian Empire	1897	100	<u>41</u>	28	16	12	3
Romania	1899	100	<u>40</u>	26	19	12	3
Transitional type							
Poland	1921	100	<u>34</u>	30	16	15	5
Iran	1976	100	<u>30</u>	28	19	17	6
USSR	1926	100	29	<u>34</u>	18	15	4
Mexico	1991	100	24	<u>27</u>	20	22	7
Ageing type							
USA	1990	100	19	19	<u>26</u>	19	17
Prussia	1925	100	18	<u>25</u>	24	<u>25</u>	8
United Kingdom	1986	100	17	19	19	21	<u>24</u>
Italy	1986	100	14	23	18	<u>26</u>	19
Terminal type							
Russian Republic	1970	100	10	16	23	<u>31</u>	20
Yugoslavia	1971	100	10	23	17	<u>29</u>	21
Russian Republic	1994	100	6	10	17	<u>35</u>	32
Romania	1979	100	5	11	10	34	<u>40</u>
Israeli type							
Palestine	1931	100	<u>33</u>	32	19	11	4
Israel	1948	100	<u>29</u>	26	26	15	4
Israel	1961	100	<u>34</u>	22	19	20	5
Israel	1996	100	<u>27</u>	24	20	18	11

^a With the exception of Palestine/Israel, countries sorted by the descending percentage of population at age 0-14. The largest age group in each population is underlined.

Source: Adapted from DellaPergola (1993-4), (see n. 88); Tolts (1997), (see n. 35).

Western Europe and gradually spreading throughout the Diaspora, brought about a gradual reduction in the proportions of younger Jews and a corresponding increase in the share of young and middle-aged adults. In the course of time, a marked trend towards ageing became typical of most Western Jewish communities, tending to reach a terminal stage in the Jewish communities in Eastern Europe where the

extreme erosion of the younger age groups foreshadows a very serious problem of demographic continuity. In Israel, on the other hand, the Jewish population has kept a rather young and balanced age profile, which constitutes an important element in the continuing momentum of population growth.

Looking towards the future involves a detailed assessment of the age-composition of each major Jewish community. The regional examples and world synthesis given here provide a typology and basic framework for individual Jewish communities which represent intermediate situations (see Figure 8). World Jewish-population age composition in the early 1990s is a composite of the various regional situations. It shows the hollow generations of the Shoah period—the 50-54 age-group born in 1939–43. As noted above, and clearly evident in the graphics, this was followed by a postwar fertility recovery, a prolonged phase of fertility decline and a new more limited expansion during the 1980s.

The overall age profile of Jews in Western Europe included fewer young children than adults and, more significantly, than those in their mid-sixties or early seventies. While there are some internal differences, it is quite an aging Jewish population. The age profile of Jews in the United States and Canada in the 1990s was somewhat younger. The proportion of children and young adults was larger, reflecting those born during the baby-boom of the 1950s and 1960s, and the echo-effect of the generations born to the baby-boomers during the 1980s and 1990s.


The age profile of East European Jewry, largely influenced by the FSU Jewish population, is striking.⁸⁹ It points to the consequences of prolonged very low levels of fertility, very high rates of assimilation and selective emigration of a comparatively higher proportion of younger families, leaving behind a large share of the elderly and very elderly. East European Jewry has lost most of its demographic basis for the future.

Finally, the age profile of the Jewish population in Israel provides the only example of a demographically balanced Jewish population with a larger basis of children sustaining gradually smaller shares of young adults, mature adults and the elderly. This mainly reflects Israel's


⁸⁹ M. Tolts, 'Recent Jewish Emigration and Population Decline in Russia', *Jews in Eastern Europe* 35 (1998).

Figure 8. *Age Composition of Jewish Populations in Major Countries and Regions, c. 1990 and 2020*


(a) West Europe




(b) East Europe




(c) United States




(d) Canada




(e) Latin America




(f) Oceania, South Africa



(g) Israel



(h) Total World



sustained birth rate and, to a minor extent, the continuous influx of a high proportion of young adults among the new immigrants.

It is from these different starting points that widely different Jewish population compositions will emerge in the year 2020.

Jewish Population Projections

Assumptions

Demographic projections are less useful as prophetic pronouncements, than as indications of the nature of current social forces and their possible implications for the future.⁹⁰ The following attempt to project into the future the current socio-demographic trends among world Jewry is based on the assumption that no major global changes will radically redirect the well-established patterns that have developed over the past few decades. Stability or moderate change were posited in various combinations of relevant variables, creating a range of more likely scenarios for the period between the 1990s and the year 2020.

Indeed, considering the discontinuities in Jewish history and the recent changes in the global polity, to expect trends in any recent past to continue unaltered in the foreseeable future is no minor assumption.⁹¹ While this constitutes a fairly normal mode of thought in calculating demographic scenarios, a wider range of outcomes is entirely possible. At the same time, one must take into account leading scholarly opinions about the future development of the general population in those countries where most Jews now live. The prevailing scenario is one of continuing moderate or low fertility, with no foreseeable reversal of the current slow population growth, and perhaps even of decline in the longer term.⁹²

⁹⁰ W. Lutz (ed.) *The Future Population of the World; What Can We Assume Today?* (London, 1996).

⁹¹ For one case-study of the manifold impact of a significant historical event on a variety of pre-existing trends see S. DellaPergola, U. Rebhun and R. P. Raicher, 'The Six-Day War and Israel-Diaspora Relations: An Analysis of Quantitative Indicators', in E. Lederhendler (ed.) *The Six Day War and World Jewry* (Baltimore, 1999, forthcoming).

⁹² R. Lesthaeghe, 'A Century of Demographic and Cultural Change in Western Europe: An Exploration of Underlying Dimensions', *Population and Development Review* 9:3 (1983) 411-35; D. van de Kaa, 'Europe's Second Demographic Transition',

As noted, Jewish population increase in Israel during the 1980s and 1990s was practically offset by decrease in the Diaspora, so that the world total tended to be rather stable. The main assumptions in the current set of projections include:

- 1) Continuing health improvements leading to slow but steady health increases in life expectancy. Towards the end of the 1990s the actual life expectancy at birth among Jews in Israel approached 75 years for males and 80 for females and tended to grow quite regularly by roughly one year of life for every 5 calendar years.⁹³
- 2) Continuing current family patterns characterized by postponed marriages, growing proportions of single adults and increasing frequencies of divorce.
- 3) Continuing fertility differentials between the Diaspora and Israel, with current levels remaining steady or moderately declining. Specifically, sub-replacement TFR levels not higher than 1.6 are assumed for Diaspora communities, versus an initial TFR of 2.6 in Israel.
- 4) Continuing high frequencies of mixed marriage in Diaspora communities, reaching levels above 50 per cent in most Jewish communities, with prevalent non-Jewish identification of the respective children.
- 5) A volume of Jewish international migration continuing at levels somewhat lower than those observed during the mid-1990s and stabilizing at a net balance of around 40,000 a year to Israel or, alternatively, tending to zero.

Expected increases or decreases in future Jewish populations will derive from varying combinations of these assumptions.⁹⁴

Population Bulletin 42:1 (1987); W. Lutz, 'Future Reproductive Behavior in Industrialized Countries', in W. Lutz (ed.) *The Future Population of the World* (sec n. 90) 253-77.

⁹³ Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, *Statistical Abstract of Israel*, Jerusalem, yearly publication.

⁹⁴ For an earlier set of Jewish population projections, reflecting the situation of the mid-1970s, see U. O. Schmëlz, *World Jewish Population: Regional Estimates and Projections* (Jerusalem, 1980).

Table 11. *Jewish Population Projections, Selected Scenarios, 2000–2020*

Jewish population (thousands)	With international migration		Without international migration	
	High	Low	High	Low
			2000	
World	13,144	12,911	13,138	12,903
Diaspora	8,262	8,041	8,496	8,272
Israel	4,882	4,870	4,642	4,631
			2010	
World	13,442	12,954	13,405	12,905
Diaspora	7,605	7,200	8,182	7,759
Israel	5,837	5,754	5,223	5,146
			2020	
World	13,821	12,972	13,727	12,854
Diaspora	6,958	6,340	7,887	7,220
Israel	6,863	6,632	5,840	5,634

Source: DellaPergola (1996), (see n. 95).


Size and Geographical Distribution

According to a conservative range of specifications, and assuming no major conflicts or environmental catastrophes, the Jewish population worldwide should remain quite stable until the year 2020 (see Table 11 and Figure 9). World Jewry would number between 12,854,000 and 13,821,000,⁹⁵ comprising a total for Diaspora communities of between 6,340,000 and 7,887,000, and for Jews in Israel of between 5,634,000 and 6,863,000. The higher range of Israeli projections reflects not only an assumption of moderately higher migration, but also the expectedly higher fertility of immigrants in Israel against their performance had they remained in their current countries of residence.

By 2020 Israel would thus represent between 41 and 52 per cent of the world's total Jewish population, against 35 per cent in 1996. Under the lower assumption for the Diaspora and the higher assumption for

⁹⁵ S. DellaPergola, 'The Jewish People Toward the Year 2020: Sociodemographic Scenarios', in A. Gonen and S. Fogel (eds) *Israel 2020: Master Plan for Israel in the 21st Century—The Macro Scenarios: Israel and the Jewish People* (Haifa, 1996) 155–87 (Hebrew).

Figure 9. *Projected Jewish Population, World, Diaspora and Israel, 1995–2020*



Israel, which would result from more migration from the FSU and possibly from other countries, the two population curves would cross before the year 2020. By then, and under those circumstances, Israel would hold a majority of the total Jewish population. A more realistic scenario would have Israel become the single largest Jewish community, ahead of the US, in the course of the second decade of the new century, and proceeding to host more than half the world's Jewish population towards the end of the third decade.

In spite of an expected moderate decline in numbers, US Jewry, with a medium projected population of about 5.6 million in 2020, would hold an even more dominant share of the Diaspora than it does today.⁹⁶ Given its comparatively less aged composition and continuing positive international migration balance, it is only after the 2030s that more significant demographic erosion would possibly affect US Jewry. Marginal Jewish population declines can be expected in Canada and in the aggregate of the Australian and South African Jewish communities. On the other hand, continuing significant demographic decline is expected in Eastern Europe, while declining scenarios can be expected for the aggregate of Western European communities and in Latin America, although to a less extreme degree than in the FSU.

Another set of Jewish-population projections which assume no international migration after the base year 1993 is presented in Table 12.⁹⁷ The purpose of such an exercise is to isolate the continuing impact of variables such as fertility and assimilation. This projection shows once again a significant increase of Jewish population in Israel, apparent stability or moderate decline in Canada and in the aggregate of Australian, New Zealand and South African Jewry, and declines of varying amounts in Latin America, Western Europe and especially Eastern Europe. Expected changes in the percentage distribution of regional Jewish communities are calculated accordingly. Intervening international migration would of course partially modify, attenuate or sharpen the trends illustrated here.

⁹⁶ U. Rebhun, S. DellaPergola and M. Tolts, 'American Jewry: A Population Projection, 1990–2020', in R. Farber and C. Waxman (eds) *Jews in America: A Contemporary Reader* (Hanover, 1999).

⁹⁷ S. DellaPergola, U. Rebhun and M. Tolts, *A New Look at the Jewish Future: World and Regional Population Projections* (Jerusalem: The Hebrew University, The A. Harman Institute of Contemporary Jewry, in preparation).

Table 12. *Jewish Population Projections, by Major Regions, 1993–2023^a*

Region	1993	2003	2013	2023
	No. (Thousands)			
Total	12,963	13,049	13,213	13,468
Israel	4,335	4,838	5,430	6,036
Diaspora	8,628	8,211	7,783	7,432
USA	5,650	5,517	5,354	5,237
Non-USA	2,978	2,694	2,429	2,195
Canada	358	350	342	337
Latin America	432	423	413	395
West Europe	1,035	999	953	907
East Europe	959	729	530	370
Oceania-S.Africa	194	193	191	186
	Per cent			
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Israel	33.4	37.1	41.1	44.8
Diaspora	66.6	62.9	58.9	55.2
USA	43.6	42.3	40.5	38.9
Non-USA	23.0	20.6	18.4	16.3
Canada	2.8	2.7	2.6	2.5
Latin America	3.3	3.2	3.1	2.9
West Europe	8.0	7.7	7.2	6.7
East Europe	7.4	5.6	4.0	2.7
Oceania-S.Africa	1.5	1.5	1.4	1.4

^a Assuming no international migration after 1993, and the continuation of other recent trends.

Source: DellaPergola *et al.* (in press), (see n. 96).

Our evaluation of the evolving demography of world Jewry may disappoint those who have high hopes for the revival of communities with a long experience of demographic decline, such as those in Eastern Europe. A general process of de-Europeanization of world Jewry is implicit in Israel's growing share of the total and in the comparatively better standing of North American Jewry facing the prospective demographic erosion of the Diaspora. But these projections do not represent anything more than a realistic portrayal and extension of the current trends. We repeat our emphasis on the solid ties that exist between Jewish population trends and more general

social developments globally: any significant changes in the current Jewish socio-demographic scenarios imply far-reaching regional and global transformations whose nature and impact is hard to imagine at the time of writing.

It should be stressed that the redirection of population trends is necessarily slow, as it passes through changes of age composition whose momentum is not easily altered. Under the present defining criteria of Jewish population, a significant departure from the prospective trends outlined here is a matter of a much longer time span than the one considered here.

Age Composition

Jewish population projections from the mid-1990s toward the 2020s foreshadow significant changes in age-composition and wide-ranging implications for the organization of Jewish community services.⁹⁸ Concerning the expected age distributions, according to the different assumptions tested here, the proportion of children under 15 is projected to range between 23 and 25 per cent of the total Jewish population in Israel, and between 9 and 14 per cent in the total of Diaspora communities. The proportion of those aged 65 and over would range between 13 and 14 per cent of the total population in Israel, but between 24 and 28 per cent in the Diaspora (see Figure 10).



According to a projection which assumes no international migration after 1993 (see again Figure 8), world Jewry's age-composition around 2020 will have a nearly rectangular shape. Age groups in the range between 0–4 and 65–69 will hold similar numbers of individuals, the main exception being in the generations born during the 1980s (aged 25–34 in 2018). It should be noted, however, that the world composite incorporates quite opposite situations in Israel and the Diaspora.

The projection confirms the presence of significant regional differences in current and expected Jewish population composition. The younger basis of the Jewish population in Western Europe—including the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Belgium, Italy, the Netherlands and a number of other smaller Jewish communities—tends to become proportionally smaller, while the elderly section of the Jewish population becomes comparatively more prominent. This would be the expected outcome of a continuation of low fertility, frequent out-marriage and a



⁹⁸ DellaPergola, 'The Jewish People Toward the Year 2020' (see n. 95).

Figure 10. *Projected Jewish Population at Ages 0–14 and 65+, by Major Countries and Regions, c. 1990 and 2020*

Age 0–14



Age 65+



weak propensity to provide Jewish identification to respective children. The extreme case is represented by the Jewish population of the FSU and other Eastern European countries, whose shape is that of a reversed pyramid. Around 2020, the largest single age group there might be of people aged 80 and more, and the smallest age group of children under 5.⁹⁹ In the United States and Canada, the past large-scale fluctuations in fertility and the expected input of continuing immigration will probably create a comparably more favourable demographic basis by the year 2020, although substantial ageing can be expected there too. On the other hand, Israel will continue to benefit in the foreseeable future from its younger Jewish age-composition, which, in spite of some ageing, will set up conditions favourable to continuing the population growth in the following decades.

As a consequence of these trends, a majority of all Jewish children in the world aged 15 or less, ranging between 57 and 72 per cent, can be expected to live in Israel by the year 2020. Nearly half of the younger segment of the Jewish population, those who attend pre-school and elementary school, were already living in Israel by the mid-1990s. By 2020, Israel will most likely be home to the absolute majority of the world Jewish school-age population, with a substantial minority in the United States and Western Europe, and with Latin America and other regions having much smaller shares. As part of the ongoing transition toward a stronger focus on Israeli society, these expected structural changes entail the gradual passage of the chief responsibility to ensure adequate Jewish education and cultural continuity among future generations from the Diaspora to Israel.

On the other hand, in around 2020 the share of the elderly living in the Diaspora will range between 66 and 71 per cent of the world's total Jewish population aged 65 and over. It should be stressed, however, that the proportional increase of the Jewish elderly will not generally imply an increase in their absolute numbers. They will rather constitute a bigger slice out of a smaller pie. Only after the year 2025, when the bulk of the generations born during the 15 years following the Second World War reach old age, can a temporary increase in numbers be expected globally.

⁹⁹ S. DellaPergola, M. Tolts and U. Rebhun, *World and Regional Jewish Population Projections: Russian Republic, 1994–2019 (Interim Report)* (Jerusalem, The Hebrew University, The A. Harman Institute of Contemporary Jewry).

Some Implications and Conclusions

The preceding analysis shows that robust and resilient socio-demographic trends have developed over time among world Jewry. One of the salient findings is the parallelism and coherence of Jewish socio-demographic trends in many different societal contexts. These range from the world's leading economic and political power, the United States of America, to its distant and in some respects antithetical counterpart, the former Soviet Union. If demographic process is posited as a dependent variable in a chain of other socio-economic and cultural determinants, after taking account of the huge differences that still prevail between nations, such convergence suggests a great amount of symmetry or even similarity in the position of Jewish minorities *vis-à-vis* the majority of society.

Some of these trends can be described as powerfully erosive to Jewish continuity; others lead to continuity under deeply transformed conditions. The crucial transformation outlined here is the gradual transition of the Jewish people from a Diaspora-centric to an Israelo-centric condition. Albeit for reasons not foreseen by the original proponents of Zionism—a serious demographic erosion of the Jewish Diaspora—the prospective results are nonetheless revolutionary in a long-term perspective. Jewish demographic trends gradually suggest a ‘normalization’ of the Jewish people, at least in the sense that the majority might eventually reside on the territory of its historical motherland, with the minority scattered elsewhere as in the case of many other nations.

It goes without saying that full normalization requires a peaceful and stable solution of the Israeli-Arab political conflict, as a prerequisite for the launching of definitive socio-economic development in the Middle East. Closing the gaps that still separate Israel from the nations at the more developed core of the world system would improve Israel's chances of retaining its immigrants and also its native population, with the consequence of sustaining the country's Jewish population growth.

At this stage, one may again ask the rhetorical question: ‘Is the Jewish people disappearing?’ The answer is ‘Certainly not’. And if the question is reformulated for Diaspora Jewry alone, the answer becomes ‘Not really, and anyhow not yet’. But three emerging facts need to be especially outlined:

- 1) The Diaspora, and in particular its European component, is bound to represent a smaller share of the global Jewish collective, especially among the younger Jewish population. The consequence in the longer term is a smaller Jewish presence in a hugely competitive political, economic and cultural market-place, hence a weaker position in the face of assertive, if not rather aggressive, competition.
- 2) There are serious doubts regarding the persistence of Jewish identification among some of the collective's most peripheral fringes. In the longer term, this suggests growing difficulties in the effort to provide one definition, all-inclusive and analytically meaningful, for the whole of the Jewish people.
- 3) A growing role for Israel is emerging within world Jewry, both in demographic terms and in the much broader sense of Israel's expected share of investment and responsibility in the running of world Jewish affairs.

The logic of some of the demographic trends currently at work among world Jewry is deeply rooted in history, as in the case of international migration, or in relatively recent and globally diffuse societal trends, as in the case of changes in the family and mixed marriage. The typical momentum of such trends makes it fairly unlikely that sudden and radical changes will occur, and even if they did it would take some time before the consequences became visible in the demographic composition and dynamics of the Jewish population. It is therefore important that the inherent logic of socio-demographic processes be well understood, even more than their immediate results, if lessons are to be learnt that will help one cope with future developments under these or somewhat different circumstances.

In the light of the preceding analysis, the leading scenario for the future points to a Jewish people increasingly concentrated in North America and Israel, with Israel possibly becoming the largest Jewish community during the first decades of the twenty-first century. The sharp age-structural differences that have developed between Israel and the Diaspora already make Israel the largest reservoir of Jewish youth and the principal and most challenging target for Jewish education. On the other hand, in the course of the coming decades the issue of ageing will become a crucial and problematic focus for Jewish community service in the Diaspora. Fewer economically productive

individuals will be available to ensure decent living conditions for a growing share of dependent elderly Jews.

A significant challenge to Jewish continuity stems both from low levels of demographic reproduction and from the poor, if any, success in retaining the cultural affiliation of a large periphery of the Jewish collective. The equally significant challenge to internal coherence and solidarity looms large in the guise of the very different modes of Jewish identification and the inherent paces of socio-demographic growth that now prevail in Israel versus the majority of Jewish communities elsewhere—and to some extent also within each Jewish community locally.

The results outlined are not the product of one single cause, but the complex and cumulative outcome of a variety of partial determinants. In terms of problem solving, as each cause must be understood and addressed on its own merit, there is no single or simple solution. Yet, it should be possible to devise Jewish community policies and interventions capable both of stimulating processes that may lead to a better demographic balance for world Jewry, and of slowing down—if not reversing—the trends now leading in the opposite direction. With the help of continuing in-depth research on the causes and consequences of Jewish population trends, this will be one of the tasks—and not a minor one—of Jewish community leaders, planners and educators in the twenty-first century.

One aspect of broad import raised in the preceding analysis is the emerging competition between individualism—the drive to achieve personal gratification—and collective identity—which may provide necessary meaning to individual existence—which characterize at one and the same time the turn of the century. If in the past individual and collective identities harmonized to strengthen the Jewish community, today more often than not they seem to be in conflict. As the conventional procreative family still constitutes the crucial connecting element between individual and community, it should be realized that a viable Jewish community is in the first place the product of its own birth rate. The alternative assumption, that the Jewish community of the future can be built mostly on the ability to reach out and attract new members from among non-Jewish children and adults—let alone parenting-by-proxy, genetic engineering or cloning—escapes socio-demographic reality.

The continuous, unfolding life-cycle character of the trends examined here must be recognized if appropriate interventions are to be attempted to redirect the developing situation. Jewish identification, the willingness to belong and its ultimate effect on Jewish demography begins at birth. It develops through early socialization, formal and informal education, family formation, social, cultural and philanthropic activity in the community and through social and economic life in the broader societal context. The typical young Jewish individual should be offered the opportunity to incorporate the various stages and institutional contexts of life, such as the family, compulsory education, youth groups, higher education, informal relational networks, residential neighbourhoods and the working environment into a meaningful and coherent complex for individual and community alike. Clearly, due to the unique combination of the size and density of its Jewish population, Israel is better equipped than other environments to offer such an opportunity. But the opportunity can be created elsewhere too, at least where the Jewish population is sufficiently large and residentially concentrated.

The quality of the association between Jews as individuals and as a community should be given greater attention. This association needs to be made more coherent and relevant. Strong and cogent relationships exist between the Jewish family, child socialization, Jewish schooling and adult Jewish identification. These should be monitored more carefully and thoughtfully than has been the case so far. Perhaps the whole concept of formal and informal Jewish educational systems should be reformulated, and better coordination between Jewish schooling, the family and the community developed. The most effective way of operating during the formative years of Jewish identification still has to be fully understood and implemented.

It is also worth stressing the importance of higher Jewish education. The vast majority of young Jews do receive some higher education, and intervention at a stage at which most are still in the educational system has a special value. In this respect, the activities of academic centres specializing in Jewish studies¹⁰⁰ are a very important resource. More frequent and systematic Israeli-Diaspora academic connections

¹⁰⁰ Such as the Oxford Centre for Hebrew and Jewish Studies and similar institutions in Israel and elsewhere.

and interchanges should be developed to enhance the continuity and coherence of lifelong Jewish awareness. Ways should be found to make Jewish life and the willingness to belong more desirable in terms of its intrinsic value, richer and more meaningful in terms of its intellectual orientation, more available in terms of opportunities and more feasible in terms of the costs, which are sometimes prohibitively high.

In the light of the expected demographic changes, the State of Israel and the Jewish world should rethink their mutual relationship. There needs to be a stronger emphasis on what Israel's Jewish community will be ready to give and capable of giving to other Jewries, and not only on what it may demand from them. Israel will have to be more directly involved and to carry more of the costs of maintaining the spiritual wellbeing and continuity of Jewish communities elsewhere. As part of this effort, ideological gaps should be bridged within the Jewish collective that often cause friction and conflict and possibly lead to a sense of estrangement among many. Ways and means should be found to reach an agreed procedure for the admission of new adoptees to Judaism. This suggestion may appear remote from the province of demography and to be only indirectly connected to the topic of this paper, but in reality it lies at its very core.

In the twenty-first century and into the third millennium and beyond there will be a Jewish people, creative and meaningful, and not a small one. But it will be significantly different from the one known in previous generations or centuries. A portion of these sweeping changes will be related to the emerging demographic trends. World Jewry needs to face these honestly and to research and understand them, rather than to be confined within old myths or new superstitions. It should be recognized that Jews often depend on circumstances beyond their control. Nevertheless, a better outcome may with effort be secured by acknowledging the situation and working towards specific ends. There should follow a realistic assessment of where and how Jewish individuals and their institutions can best shape their own demographic and cultural future, and a willingness to initiate decisions and processes apt to promote these goals.

There are enough Jewish human resources and other assets available to face the socio-demographic challenges of the year 2000 and beyond successfully. As a result, the less attractive part of the future Jewish demographic scenario might still be proven wrong.

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